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WHO STOLE THE COOKIE FROM THE
COOKIE JAR?: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
SHIFTING BLAME IN CRIMINAL CASES
Ellen Yankiver Suni
Who stole the cookie from the cookie jar?
Number 1 stole the cookie from the cookie jar
Not me
Yes you
Couldn't be
Then who?
Number 2 stole the cookie from the cookie jar.1
INTRODUCTION

D

ENIALS are a basic and often automatic response to an allegation
that we have committed some wrong. Every parent has heard
"not me" more times than he or she wants to acknowledge. This
common retort is reflected in the children's game above. The "not
me" response is instinctive in young children, but as we mature, we
learn that "not me" is often followed by the question: "If not you,
then who?" Accordingly, we discover that denial is not nearly as
effective unless we shift the blame to someone else.
This
phenomenon of childhood applies with equal force in criminal cases,
where a defendant has been accused of wrongdoing.2 Where that
defendant denies responsibility, says "not me," and attempts to
introduce evidence to address the "then who" question, what, if any,
responsibilities does defense counsel have before engaging in blameshifting behavior? Are there specific rules or considerations that
apply in such situations? This Article will address those questions.
The issue of blame-shifting has appeared recently in a series of
episodes on the popular television show "The Practice" as well as in

* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City (UMKC) School of
Law. I am grateful to Delanora (Debbie) Brooks for her research and editing
assistance.
1. The source of this verse is unknown.

2. "'I didn't do it, someone else did!' This claim is certainly among the most
ancient and basic that a criminal defendant can make." David McCord, "Bt Perry

Mason Made It Look So Easy!": The Admissibility of Evidence Offered By a Criminal
Defendant to Suggest That Someone Else Is Guilty, 63 Tenn. L Rev. 917, 919 (1996).

1643

1644

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

recent cases. In analyzing this issue, Part I will initially focus on the
situation in "The Practice."'4 It will set out the scenario from the show
and discuss the responsibilities of the defense lawyers in presenting an
alternative-perpetrator defense, both from the standpoint of general
ethical considerations and prevailing rules and standards of
professional conduct. Part II will then explore the limitations on this
type of blame-shifting found in rules of evidence. After questioning
whether the evidentiary rules are consistent with our conclusions
based on ethical analysis in Part III, Part IV will suggest that the
prevailing evidentiary rules are wrong. Finally, this Article will
conclude with proposals to change these rules to address the apparent
disjunction between the perceived ethical obligations of reasonably
3. For example, the effort to shift blame to Columbian drug lords in the O.J.
Simpson case, see McCord, supra note 2, at 972 n.251; the attempt to shift blame to
the "Elohim City conspiracy" in the McVeigh case and the related effort to attack the
police investigation, see United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1189-92 (10th Cir.
1998); and the recent attempt to shift blame to Abner Louima, the victim of brutality
by New York City police officer Justin Volpe which, although it involved shifting
blame to the victim, was highly publicized and precipitated much public reaction.
Incidents of blame-shifting such as these have prompted one recent article on the
subject and action by the Center for Community Interest to make lawyers liable for
false statements made about third parties during trial. See Debra Baker, Shreddingthe
Truth, ABA J. 40, 44 (October 1999); CCI Friday Fax (last modified June 4, 1999)
<http://www.communityinterest.org/Friday-fax /ff060499.htm> (a publication of the
Center for Community Interest). For a discussion of the related issue of shifting
blame to victims, see Ellen Yaroshefsky, Balancing Victim's Rights and Vigorous
Advocacy for the Defendant, 1989 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 135 (1990).
4. It may appear odd to some to use a fictional case as a basis for a discussion of
a legal and ethical issue, but it sets out the problem well and has other significant
advantages. Because it is fictional, we are privy to information that we normally
would not have, or could not disclose (due to confidentiality considerations), that is
helpful to the discussion. Of course, there is the issue of realism, but I find the
development of the story to be reflective of the issues at stake, at least with regard to
a defendant represented by private counsel, whether they are addressed realistically
or not. Moreover, and equally important, it reflects what members of the public (or
at least some segment of the TV-watching public) see as how lawyers conduct
themselves. Many lay people believe TV accurately reflects the way lawyers behave.
See Leonard E. Gross, The Public Hates Lawyers: Why Should We Care?, 29 Seton
Hall L. Rev. 1405, 1407, 1424 (1999). In fact, a surprising number of people actually
believe Perry Mason and Matlock are real lawyers. See Angelique M. Paul, Turning
the Camera on Court TV: Does Televising Trials Teach Us Anything About the Real
Law?, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 655, 656 n.6 (1997). "Most people get most of their
information about law and lawyers from watching television and movies." Michael
Asimow, Section Watches a Little TV at Midyear Meeting, Admin. & Reg. L. News,
Spring 1999, at 1. Looking at this issue using a case which provides much background
information and to which lawyers and members of the public can relate thus seems
sensible.
5. This defense is sometimes called the SODDI defense, which "is popularly
known in the trade as 'Some Other Dude Did It." United States v. Lively, 817 F.
Supp. 453, 462-63 & n.4 (D. Del. 1993); James Joseph Duane, What Message Are We
Sending to Criminal Jurors When We Ask Them to "Send a Message" With Their
Verdict?, 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 565, 627 (1995); see also McCord, supra note 2, at 920
(coining a new term for "SODDI" called "aaltperp" (alleged alternative
perpetrator)).
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zealous criminal defense attorneys and rules that improperly restrict
that zeal.
I.

6
"THE PRACrICE:" PLAN B

The storyline in a series of episodes of "The Practice" began when
the defendant, George Vogelman, arrived at the law offices of
Donnell, Dole, Young & Frutt with a human head in his medical bag.
Vogelman had a prior relationship with Ellenor Frutt, one of the
partners in the firm, and he came to the firm seeking assistance. He
told the attorneys that he had had a sexual encounter with a young
woman the night before at a hotel and left to return home. In the
morning, he found the victim's head in his medical bag in his car. He
denied any involvement in her death and insisted she was alive when
he left. The attorneys arranged for Vogelman to surrender to the
authorities.
When the police investigated, they found the victim dead in the
hotel room, with no indication of forced entry or anyone else having
been present in the room. In addition, they found a small amount of
the victim's blood in the defendant's car. Not surprisingly, the police
charged Vogelman with murder.
Vogelman was a loner who had difficulty establishing sustained
relationships with women. He continued to deny any part in the
murder. He was represented by the firm, and more particularly by
Ellenor Frutt and Eugene Young, experienced criminal defense
lawyers. They believed his protestations of innocence and concluded
that he must have been framed. They expended considerable
resources in unsuccessfully investigating possibilities of who could
have killed the victim, but eventually ran out of money to continue!
As trial approached, they discovered that the victim had found her
boyfriend with another woman shortly before her death. This could
have possibly explained why she would have gone to a hotel with
George Vogelman. They also discovered, in interviewing the victim's
brother, that she had been spending a lot of time on the Internet
talking to people she did not know.8 Because they were looking for
some evidence to show the jury that someone else could have killed
the victim and framed Vogelman, Frutt and Young asked her brother
to testify to that effect and he reluctantly agreed.
The trial progressed as expected. In a firm meeting prior to
beginning the defense, a discussion ensued regarding how to proceed.
6. This description is based on television episodes of the show aired primarily in
October and November 1998. See The Practice(ABC television broadcast, Oct.-Nov.
1998).
7. They explored one lead, that the murderer might be "The Poet," a serial killer
still at large, but the killing did not sufficiently fit his modus operandi. See id.
8. The lawyers requested that the police follow up on these leads, but the police
declined to do so. See id
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One attorney suggested they rest without putting the defendant on the
stand and urged a "burden of proof" defense. There was general
agreement that such a defense was not likely to work. The obvious
question, raised by Jimmy Berluti, the practical, down-to-earth
attorney in the firm, was "If not George, who?" When Frutt
responded that it was not their job to answer that question, Berluti
reminded her that "It's the question the jury will ask." Frutt
responded that she could not advance a theory she could not support.
When the senior partner reminded them that the defense was "the
police stopped looking; that's why we don't know," Berluti cautioned
the attorneys that, on the facts of this case, the jury was unlikely to be
persuaded by arguments relating solely to faulty police investigation.
After considerable argument about strategy, Lindsey Dole, one of
the attorneys, asked why the boyfriend and brother had not been
considered as possible suspects. She noted, looking through the file,
that they had no official alibis. Frutt responded that they were
checked out and were "choir boys," but Dole suggested that the
attorneys "Plan B" them. After discussion it was agreed that if, after
dissecting their statements, they were still viable suspects, both the
boyfriend and the brother would be subjected to a "soft Plan B."
While the attorneys recognized that this strategy was risky and had to
be executed carefully so as not to backfire, a preliminary decision was
made to proceed with the plan.
"Plan B" is the term used by the firm for blame-shifting. The plan
involves examination of a witness in a manner designed to suggest that
the witness, rather than the defendant, may have committed the
offense. In its "hard" version, Plan B is designed to create a
reasonable doubt by identifying a proposed alternative perpetrator on
whom to shift the blame. In its "soft" version, which was planned
here, the plan is designed to create doubt by providing a basis to argue
a series of "what ifs."
Young and Frutt met with Vogelman and presented the Plan B
option to him.
They explained the risks and dangers 9 and
recommended that they go forward with a "soft Plan B" of both the
boyfriend and brother. Although Vogelman claimed not to be "a big
fan of accusing people falsely," he reluctantly agreed in light of the
lack of options. Meanwhile, others in the firm investigated the
whereabouts of the brother and the boyfriend on the night of the
crime to make sure there was nothing that could rule them out.
In traditional TV fashion, just as Frutt was beginning her crossexamination of the boyfriend with an intent to engage in a soft Plan B,
9. They were concerned that the jury could erroneously view the alternative
theory as one that the defendant was required to prove, and that they could thereby
lose the benefit of being able to merely create reasonable doubt. In addition, they
were concerned that, if not handled properly, the strategy could backfire and alienate

the jury. See id.
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she received a message indicating that the boyfriend's whereabouts
were established for the time of the homicide by phone records. As a
result, she backed off. Based on this setback, a decision was made to
subject Steve Robin, the victim's brother, to a hard Plan B.
He was called as the next witness. Young elicited testimony from
Robin that the victim had talked to someone on a chatline and he
requested more details. The brother was unable to provide the
requested information and indicated that he and his sister had not
been very close. In response to that statement, Young elicited that
there had been some tension between the victim and her brother over
the effect of his failed business and his moving back home on their
father, who was terminally ill. Through astute examination, and over
the continuing objections of the prosecutor, Young developed a series
of questions to suggest that Robin could have followed his sister to the
bar where she met Vogelman and then to the hotel. After having the
brother declared a hostile witness, Young asked a series of questions
to confirm the brother's business failure, his substantial debts, his
father having only eight months to live and his becoming the sole
beneficiary of his father's will upon his father's death. He then
questioned Robin to establish that he took lithium for depression and
that no one could confirm his claim to have been at home on the night
of the crime.
Young closed his examination by asking, "did you murder your
sister and frame George Vogelman, follow her to the bar and go to
the hotel, get the address by running her plates, make yourself the
sole beneficiary, and plant her head in George Vogelman's car?" Of
course, Robin answered an indignant "no," but the seeds had been
planted. After suggesting that the brother may have been able to deal
with sibling rivalry and his debts all at once, Young turned to another
line of questioning. He asked if the police had ever questioned Robin
about his involvement in the crime and elicited the expected negative
answer. After some likely objectionable comments, Young concluded
his examination.
Although the attorneys believed that the examination had been
effective, Young was upset at having been forced to do it." Again, in
dramatic TV fashion, the father, enraged by Young's conduct,
confronted him in the hallway and charged him with betraying their
trust. He struck Young with his crutch. The trial then proceeded with
George Vogelman's testimony denying involvement in the crime."
10. When Frutt told him he "did great," Young responded, "The kid lost his sister,
I accused him of killing her and his dad is dying. Don't try to make me feel good."

See id.
11. Again, in TV fashion, the defense called Helen Gamble as their final witness.

She was a member of the prosecutor's office and a friend of members of the firm.
Frutt had her testify to a conversation between the two women in which Gamble

admitted the prosecutor's office needed a conviction in the case and was not anxious
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In closing argument, Frutt admitted that, with the victim's head in
his bag, Vogelman was the likely suspect, but stressed that no one saw
him do it and no weapon was ever found. She argued that this was
because "he didn't do it." She then addressed Steve Robin and
admitted they had no direct evidence he committed the crime.
However, she argued that he could have, and that the reason we can't
know is because the police never bothered to investigate. She claimed
he had motive, opportunity, and no alibi, yet the police did not even
investigate the possibility. Frutt mentioned the boyfriend and the
Poet as other possible suspects who were also unaccounted for,12 and
stressed that the police never even investigated these two suspects
because they wanted to keep the case uncomplicated. She argued
Vogelman's lack of motive and his voluntarily coming forward to the
police. She concluded by reminding the jury that there were lots of
questions that were never asked or explored. The prosecution's case
is "'It must've been him.' But he didn't do it. They're prosecuting the
wrong man."
The government's closing stressed that all of the evidence pointed
to George Vogelman. The prosecution characterized the defense case
as "nothing but spin." After a relatively brief deliberation, the jury
returned a verdict of not guilty.13
II. THE ETHICAL PROPRIETY OF BLAME-SHIFTING: APPLICATION
OF ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS TO THE VOGELMAN CASE

Did the lawyers representing George Vogelman do the right thing
in their questioning of Steve Robin? Was their conduct morally and
ethically proper? Did they act as reasonably zealous criminal defense
lawyers or were they acting in an inappropriate, super-aggressive
manner? These are difficult questions about which reasonable minds
may differ.14
Potential problems with the lawyers' conduct seemingly arise from
the fact that Young and Frutt clearly did not believe that Robin had
anything to do with the murder of his sister. They had no basis to
believe that he did, and in fact, the evidence pointed clearly to the fact
that he did not. Yet, despite the lack of any true, non-frivolous basis
to contend that Steve Robin might be a murderer, their aggressive,
to confuse things with further investigation. See id.
12. Of course, she knew the boyfriend had actually been ruled out by the firm's
investigation. See id; supra note 7.
13. In a later episode, the firm is sued for defamation and intentional infliction of
emotional distress by the Robins. Although the judge allowed the case to go to trial,
the attorneys prevailed. Eventually, it was revealed that George Vogelman was in
fact guilty of killing Susan Robin as well as of vicious attacks on other women. See
The Practice(ABC television broadcast, Fall 1999).
14. The degree of disagreement is demonstrated by discussions on CRIMPROF,
the discussion list for criminal law and procedure professors. Postings are on file with
this author.
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hostile examination of him was designed to create just that impression
in the minds of the jurors. Did this blame-shifting conduct constitute
presentation of a false defense? Moreover, if it did, was it improper?
Initially, it seems clear that their conduct would have been viewed
as immoral and unethical had the questioning occurred outside the
context of the adversary system. Their attempt to create the false
impression that Steve Robin was responsible for the murder of his
sister constituted deceptive conduct, and their false attribution of
criminal conduct to him may well have been defamatory. 5 Does the
fact that this conduct occurred in the course of their role as criminal
defense lawyers within the adversary system6 of criminal justice shield
them from moral criticism for their actions?
There are those who urge that defense counsel can, and perhaps
must, do anything within the bounds of law to represent their clients,
regardless of innocence or guilt and regardless of the effect on third
persons or the truth.17 Proponents of this view often quote Lord
Brougham's classic statement in his representation of the Queen in
Queen Caroline'sCase:8

An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in
15. "Imputing criminal behavior to an individual is generally considered
defamatory per se, and actionable without proof of special damages." Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 697 (1976); see also Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation § 7.11, at 7-7
(2d ed. 1999) (stating that implication of criminal conduct by another is slanderous).
16. It does likely shield them from liability for defamation due to the litigator's
absolute privilege to defame, which is recognized in virtually all jurisdictions in the
United States. See Paul T. Hayden, Reconsideringthe Litigator'sAbsohute Privilegeto
Defame, 54 Ohio St. LJ. 985, 991-92 (1993). The existence of this privilege as
absolute has been questioned, not only in scholarly commentary but by an
organization seeking legislative change as well. See Baker, supra note 3,at 44; CCI
Friday Fax, supranote 3.
17. See Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 15 (1951).
For more recent views, see Abbe Smith and William Montross, The Calling of
Criminal Defense, 50 Mercer L. Rev. 443, 523-33 (1999); Gerald F. Uelmen, Lord
Brougham's Bromide: Good Lawyers as Bad Citizens, 30 Loy. LA. L Rev. 119, 122
(1996).
1& See, eg., Curtis, supra note 17, at 3-4 (quoting Lord Brougham's statement);
Monroe H. Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics 65-66 (1990) [hereinafter
Freedman, Understanding] (same); W. William Hodes, Lord Brougham, The Dream
Team, and Jury Nullification of the Third Kind, 67 U. Colo. L.Rev. 1075, 1083 & n.18
(1996) (same); Smith & Montross, supra note 17, at 446 n.20 (same); Uelmen, supra
note 17, at 120 (same). Geoffrey Hazard characterized Lord Brougham's statement
as:
"the classic vindication of the lawyer's partisan role" and says that "Itihis
basic narrative has been sustained over two centuries notwithstanding
pervasive changes in American society and in the profession itself." In
recent years, however, scholars of the legal profession generally have
criticized Brougham's stance and have taken a less single-minded view of an
advocate's responsibility.
Albert W. Alschuler, How to Win the Trial of the Century: The Ethics of Lord
Brougham and the O.1 Simpson Team, 29 McGeorge L. Rev. 291, 292 (1998)
(citations omitted).
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all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all
means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons,
and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in
performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the
destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of
a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of the
consequences, though9 it should be his unhappy fate to involve his
country in confusion.'

Generally, those who take this position are willing to accept a high
degree of role-differentiated 0 behavior on the part of criminal
defense lawyers and are unwilling to hold such attorneys accountable
for the guilt or
2 immorality of their clients or actions taken on their
clients' behalf. '
Varying justifications have been advanced for this conception of
zealous advocacy in service to the client's interests.? It has been
suggested that an aggressive defense is necessary to advance the
19. 18 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (1821).
20. Role-differentiation occurs when, due to her professional role, the lawyer
assumes a different moral posture than laypersons facing similar ethical questions.
See Freedman, Understanding, supra note 18, at 45 (citing Wassertstrom, Lawyers As
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 A.B.A. Human Rights 1, 3 (1975)); Fred C.
Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction in Professional Responsibility, 7 J.
Contemp. Legal Issues 165, 165 (1996).
21. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to
Sustain Public Defenders, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1239, 1249-50 (1993) (describing this
view); see also Murray L. Schwartz, On Making the True Look False and the False
Look True, 41 Sw. L.J. 1135, 1152 (1988) ("A lawyer who undertakes to provide a
service that the Constitution demands, and who does so in ways that are both
expected and powerfully justified, should have a sufficient answer to a charge of
immoral behavior posed by the moralist in a particular case.").
22. Another well-known statement appears in Mr. Justice White's concurrence in
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967):
But defense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain or present
the truth. Our system assigns him a different mission. He must be and is
interested in preventing the conviction of the innocent, but, absent a
voluntary plea of guilty, we also insist that he defend his client whether he is
innocent or guilty. The State has the obligation to present the evidence.
Defense counsel need present nothing, even if he knows what the truth is.
He need not furnish any witnesses to the police, or reveal any confidences of
his client, or furnish any other information to help the prosecution's case. If
he can confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make him appear at a
disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his normal course. Our
interest in not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put the State to its
proof, to put the State's case in the worst possible light, regardless of what
he thinks or knows to be the truth. Undoubtedly there are some limits
which defense counsel must observe but more often than not, defense
counsel will cross-examine a prosecution witness, and impeach him if he can,
even if he thinks the witness is telling the truth, just as he will attempt to
destroy a witness who he thinks is lying. In this respect, as part of our
modified adversary system and as part of the duty imposed on the most
honorable defense counsel, we countenance or require conduct which in
many instances has little, if any, relation to the search for truth.
Id. at 256-59 (citations omitted).
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autonomy and dignity of the criminal defendant, 2 and that obligations
of loyalty and fidelity to the client not only justify, but command,
aggressive advocacy by the lawyer on behalf of the defendant!' This
is sometimes termed the "client-centered" justification for zealous
advocacy.25
6
Alternatively, other theorists believe that systemic justifications
warrant a zealous criminal defense. Relying on the nature of the
adversary system, they claim that aggressive advocacy is necessary to
check oppression or overreaching by the state2 7 Viewing criminal
defense as the classic situation in which adversary ethics are justified,
these proponents of zealous advocacy in criminal defense recognize
"the importance of overprotecting individual rights against the state"-"
and urge for "something closer to the standard picture of the
adversary advocate."2 9
Not surprisingly, these views are not universally held. There are
those who strongly dispute the justifications offered for what they see
as overly aggressive advocacy by criminal defense lawyers. Perhaps
the primary proponent of this position is Professor William Simon,
who challenges each of the justifications proposed by the proponents
of aggressive defense and finds them "implausible."-" While Professor
Simon recognizes that there may be situations in which aggressive
advocacy is justified, as a general rule, he is unpersuaded that "there is
23. See Freedman, Understanding, supra note 18, at 65 ("Closely related to the
concept of client autonomy is the lawyer's obligation to give 'entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the
exertion of [the lawyer's] utmost learning and ability."' (quoting ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics Canon 15 (1908))); see also Ogletree, supra note 21, at 1251-54
(discussing Professor Charles Fried's personal autonomy argument). This emphasis
on autonomy is rejected by Professor David Luban. See David Luban, Partisanship,
Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen
Ellmann, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1004, 1035-43 (1990) [hereinafter Luban, Reply to
Ellmann].
24. This position was taken most recently in a provocative article relying heavily
on religious texts to justify what the authors characterize as the noble calling of
criminal defense. See Smith & Montross, supra note 17, at 519-21. Using "virtue
ethics" to establish the ethical framework for their analysis, the authors conclude that
the ethic of fidelity supports aggressive advocacy by criminal defense lawyers. See id.
at 511-33.
25. See Ogletree, supra note 21, at 1250.
26. See id. at 1254-60.
27. A prime proponent of this position is Professor David Luban. See David
Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 Mich. L Rev. 1729, 1730-52, 1755
(1993) [hereinafter Luban, CriminalDefenders];see also John B. Mitchell, Reasonable
Doubts Are Where You Find Them: A Response to ProfessorSubin's Position on the
Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission", 1 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 339, 346.49 (1987)
(characterizing our criminal justice system as a "screening system" in which the
defense attorney protects the interests of the factually innocent).
28. Luban, CriminalDefenders,supra note 27, at 1756.
29. Id.
30. William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1703,
1728 (1993).
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any feature distinctive to the criminal sphere that would lead one who
disapproved of aggressive
defense... in the civil sphere to approve of
31

it in criminal defense.

Other detractors of aggressive defense are more particularly
concerned with its impact on the ascertainment of truth. They urge
that criminal defense lawyers have a primary obligation to the truth
and that aggressive tactics that distort and mislead are inconsistent
with this obligation. 3 These scholars urge that a defendant does not
have a right to present a false defense, which they define as putting
forward a defense the lawyer knows is false by means of "truthdefeating devices '33 or deceiving jurors by asking them to draw
knowingly false inferences from the facts. 4 In response to those who
urge that systemic justifications warrant aggressive advocacy that
includes truth-distortion, these theorists contend that engaging in
distortion, deceit, and similar conduct in individual cases to advance
truth in the larger scheme is unjustified.35
Thousands of pages have been dedicated to these competing
arguments, and this Article has nothing to add to the general
discourse.36 Suffice it to say that, while "nearly all theorists and
practitioners agree that the defender's role is morally justified,"37
there is no clear-cut consensus on precisely what that role is or should
be and what kind or degree of conduct is justified within it. This is
31. Id. at 1705. Others have questioned whether it is appropriate to draw a
categorical distinction between criminal and civil cases. See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper,
A Lawyer's Amoral EthicalRole: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities,1986
Am. B. Found. Res. J. 613, 623 (suggesting that the lines between criminal and civil
litigations are not that clear); Zacharias, supra note 20, at 178-94 (arguing that only a
small minority of criminal cases really fit into the "criminal paradigm").
32. Judge Frankel was an early proponent of this position, and Professor Harry
Subin has more recently advanced these views. See generally Marvin E. Frankel,
Partisan Justice (1980) (discussing the flaws in the advocacy system); Marvin Frankel,
The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031, 1055-57 (1975)
(arguing for a standard which would "make truth a paramount objective"); Harry I.
Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission": Reflections on the "Right" to
Present a False Case, 1 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 125, 149-52 (1987) [hereinafter Subin,
Different Mission] (proposing a new standard that prohibits an attorney from
asserting defenses that she knows to be untrue).
Professor Subin's views initially appeared in a series of articles involving a dialogue
between him and Professor Mitchell. See Mitchell, supra note 27; Harry I. Subin, Is
This Lie Necessary? FurtherReflections on the Right to Present a False Defense, 1
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 689 (1988) [hereinafter Subin, FurtherReflections].
33. Subin, Different Mission, supra note 32, at 126.
34. See Subin, FurtherReflections, supra note 32, at 697.
35. See Subin, Different Mission, supra note 32, at 148-49.
36. For those unfamiliar with the discourse, I suggest starting with Monroe H.
Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three
Hardest Questions, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1469 (1966), which, to a large extent, precipitated
much of the later debate and the Simon-Luban and Subin-Mitchell dialogues. See
Luban, CriminalDefenders, supra note 27; Simon, supra note 30; supra note 32 and
sources cited therein.
37. Ogletree, supra note 21, at 1259.
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particularly true with regard to issues related to the representation of
a guilty defendant. However, there is no serious dispute that when a
defendant chooses to go to trial,38 the criminal defense lawyer has an
obligation to represent the defendant, whether guilty or not, so as to
require the government to meet its constitutionally mandated burden
of proof. 9 Failure to conduct such a defense constitutes both ethical
misconduct' and potentially violates the defendant's right to effective
assistance of counsel.
Analysis of the blame-shifting examination and argument in the
Vogelman case has two separate but related dimensions. First, to the
extent that the attorneys did not believe, and in fact likely disbelieved,

the inferences they advanced by their questioning and argument
regarding Steve Robin's responsibility for his sister's death, their
conduct potentially subverted, rather than advanced, the truth. Was
their use of this examination and argument ethically objectionable on
this ground? Additionally, they engaged in a hostile, harassing
examination of a witness who they ambushed on the witness stand and
virtually accused of murdering his sister. Did their actions in
attempting to cast guilt on an innocent person similarly amount to
morally inappropriate conduct? For clarity, these related issues will
be addressed separately.

38. The overwhelming majority of defendants do not do so. Statistics indicate that
over 90% of defendants charged with violent felonies plead guilty. See Daniel
Givelber, MeaninglessAcquittals, Meaningfid Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the
Innocent?, 49 Rutgers L. Rev. 1317, 1337 (1997); see also Donald A. Dripps,
Miscarriagesof Justice and the Constitution, 2 Buff. Crim. L Rev. 635, 646 (1999)
[hereinafter Dripps, Miscarriages]("Once it becomes clear that the government has a
strong case, the factually guilty plead in large numbers.").
39. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 27, at 347 (arguing that by "pushing hard in
every case," whether the client is guilty or not, a lawyer fulfills his obligation); Subin,
FurtherReflections, supra note 32, at 696-97 (arguing that an attorney has to use
different tactics to make the prosecution meet its burden of proof).
40. Failure to advance the client's legitimate interests likely constitutes violation
of the duties of diligence and competence found in Model Rules 1.1 and 1.3. The
concern with underzealous representation by criminal defense lawyers is serious.
Studies demonstrate that many defense lawyers provide less than adequate
representation to their clients at all stages of the proceedings. Despite the volume of
writing on aggressive advocacy and overly zealous representation, many
commentators have noted that there is a much more serious problem in the system
with underzealous, rather than overzealous, representation. See Abbe Smith,
Burdening the Least of Us: "Race-Conscious" Ethics in CrininalDefense, 77 Tex. L
Rev. 1585, 1589-90 n.27 (1999) (collecting authorities); see also James S. Kunen,
"How Can You Defend Those People?" 256 (1983) ("[lIt's better to be overzealous
than underzealous. Overzealousness can be corrected by the prosecution ....
Underzealousness cannot be corrected by anyone.").
41. While most tactical or strategic choices are insulated from review as
ineffective assistance of counsel, failure to competently assess tactical obligations can
fall below the constitutionally mandated standard of acting as a reasonably competent
attorney. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,685-86 (1984).
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A. Presentinga False Defense

Did George Vogelman's attorneys "present a false defense"4 in this
case? In the course of his examination of Steve Robin, Eugene Young
elicited truthful answers to his questions regarding Robin's debts, his
disagreements with his sister, his status as a beneficiary under his
father's will and other information related to a possible motive to kill
his sister.

Young and Frutt then used these truthful answers to

suggest what they believed to be a possible, yet likely untrue,43
inference that Steve Robin murdered his sister. Does this constitute
improper, truth-subverting conduct?
Obviously, those who believe that truth is not the primary objective
in the adversary system of criminal justice will likely have no problem
with this scenario on truth-subversion grounds. They believe that, in
order to adequately defend, attorneys need freedom to argue any
legitimate inference from true facts, regardless of the lawyer's belief in
the truth of those inferences.'
Moreover, Professor Luban
specifically acknowledges the need to permit a criminal defense
lawyer, as part of suggesting reasonable doubts, to present an
alternative scenario. "[W]e are typically able to doubt an explanation
only when we are persuaded, at least provisionally, of an alternative
explanation. Thus, the effective defender cannot simply protest that
the prosecution has not made its case. Rather, she must introduce and
''
embellish plausible alternatives to the prosecutor's explanations."45
42. "In Subin's terms, a false defense is an attempt to 'convince the judge or jury
that facts established by the state and known to the attorney to be true are not true,
or that facts known to the attorney to be false are true."' Mitchell, supra note 27, at
340.
43. This can be a controversial issue. At what point does an attorney know the
client is guilty or that a fact asserted is not true? Some commentators have asserted
that the attorney must know "beyond a reasonable doubt." Subin, Different Mission,
supra note 32, at 142. There are those who question whether the attorney can ever
really "know." See, e.g., David N. Yellin, "Thinking Like A Lawyer" or Acting Like A
Judge?:A Response to ProfessorSimon, 27 Hofstra L. Rev. 13, 17-18 (1998) (asserting
that there are different degrees of knowledge and suspicion, and hypothesizing that
an attorney can easily evade this 'knowledge'). However, this view has been largely
discredited. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1140 (stating that the Supreme
Court established clear boundaries on when knowledge would be presumed). For an
interesting discussion of such knowledge in the context of the O.J. Simpson case, see
Hodes, supra note 18, at 1077-78 n.5. In the Vogelman case, the lawyers clearly did
not believe that Steve Robin killed his sister. The attorneys working on the case
never even anticipated that theory, and there is every reason to believe that they
rejected it as a real possibility. Moreover, the characterization of Steve Robin as a
"choir boy" in the course of discussing Plan B belies any belief on their part that he
was a murderer. See The Practice(ABC television broadcast, Oct.-Nov. 1998).
44. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1146. Professor Schwartz notes, however, that
untrue testimony should not be exploited for its probative value but only to show that
the government failed to meet its burden of proof. See id. As will be argued,
however, this distinction may be illusory. See infra note 45.
45. Luban, Criminal Defenders, supra note 27, at 1760. For an analysis that
supports Luban, see Carl M. Selinger, Dramatizing On Film the Uneasy Role of the
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Professor Luban recognizes that
if these alternatives are plausible, whether or not they are true, then
it is logically impossible that the state has proven its case beyond a
reasonable doubt. But in another sense, it involves deception,
because the advocate will never get the judge or jury to accept the
plausibility of an alternative without at least half-persuading them of
its actuality. 6
Despite this recognition, Professor Luban apparently concludes that
this is an acceptable part of putting the government to its proof. If
this is so, then affirmatively asking the jury to believe that Steve
Robin was the killer would be appropriate.

It is possible that even those, like Professor Harry Subin, who find it
ethically objectionable for attorneys to present a false defense and
who would therefore permit attorneys who know of a client's guilt to
serve only in a "monitor" role,47 might not object to the crossexamination in the Vogelman case on "truth-subversion" grounds.
John Mitchell states that an argument that goes to the quality,
reliability, or adequacy of the prosecution's case is always an
He suggests that an "it
appropriate reasonable doubt argument.'
doesn't make sense" argument meets even the monitoring
American CriminalDefense Lawyer: True Believer, 22 Okla. City U. L Rev. 223,22526 (1997). But see Theresa Stanton Collett, UnderstandingFreedman'sEthics, 33 Ariz.
L. Rev. 455,465 (1991) (recognizing the need for story-completeness but rejecting the
right of attorneys to complete the story using false evidence or inferences). This need
for competing stories is confirmed by recent studies that have shown that decisionmaking by juries really involves narrative construction. Rather than engaging in
sophisticated logical analysis of the evidence, jurors are thought to instead construct
stories out of the evidence presented. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A
Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 Cardozo L Rev.
519, 533-44 (1991). This process generally involves determining the prosecutor's
story, assessing any gaps therein, and attempting to fill in those gaps based on the
juror's pre-existing experience and understanding. The defense, too, must generally
present a story despite having no burden of proof. In deciding what story to accept,
the trier of fact will likely rely on the coverage and coherence of the competing
stories. See id. at 520-33. And while it is true that, because the government bears the
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury does not have to fully "buy" the
defendant's story, to a large extent the benefits to a defendant of the government
being required to carry a high burden of proof may be negated unless the defense can
present its own version of the case. See also Smithart v. State, 988 P.2d 583, 591
(Alaska 1999) (reversing a conviction because the defendant, who was restricted from
referring to evidence in his opening statement, was unable to present a coherent story
to the jury, finding that the restriction "robbed [defendant's] case of its cohesion and
narrative force and impaired his right to present his own defense.").
46. Luban, CriminalDefenders,supra note 27, at 1760. In addition to the ethical
concerns, there are tactical considerations that may affect how the attorney proceeds.
There is a risk that raising the issue through hostile examination and then backing off
or pushing a weak theory too far, if not done carefully, can alienate the jury or hurt
the attorney's credibility. See supra note 9. These tactical considerations themselves
serve as a limit on the attorney's conduct.
47. Subin, Different Mission, supra note 32, at 146-47.
48. See Mitchell, supra note 27, at 358-59.
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requirements Professor Subin has proposed.49 Professor Subin, in
response to Professor Mitchell, has himself acknowledged that "when
the defense attorney knows that the prosecution's evidence is true, he
or she may nonetheless suggest to the jury alternative explanations of
the facts, for the purpose of assisting the jury to measure the weight of
the evidence. ' '5° Professor Subin would, however, require that the
jury "be instructed as to the limited purpose for which these
alternative explanations, made without a good faith basis, are being
offered."51 Ellenor Frutt's argument to the jury, which suggested
reasonable doubt by raising the possibility of Steve Robin as the killer
and urging the jury to use that possibility as a means of questioning
the propriety of the police investigation, may not have met Subin's
exacting requirements." But this is not a case in which the attorneys
knew that their client was guilty. Given the absence of such
knowledge, it is unclear whether Professor Subin would find this
argument objectionable. 3

Thus, where, as here, the attorneys do not know that their client is
guilty, blame-shifting conduct does not appear to be ethically
inappropriate on "truth-subversion" grounds. In the more difficult
case where the guilt of the client is known, some commentators would
draw a distinction and preclude the argument of false inferences, at
least if those inferences are to be used for their probative value. 4
Where the false inferences are argued merely to suggest that the
government has not met its burden, most commentators would not
find this ethically objectionable.
49. Id.
50. Subin, FurtherReflections, supra note 32, at 690.
51. Id.
52. The argument may have gone too far in suggesting that the jury accept the
proposition that Steve Robin might be guilty, and it lacked any explicit disclaimer
regarding the appropriate and inappropriate uses of the inferences.
53. This likely turns on whether he believes that the determining factor is whether
they knew beyond a reasonable doubt that Steve Robin was not the murderer, or
whether they knew beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. This is somewhat
unclear from Professor Subin's analysis. The reference in Frutt's closing argument to
the victim's boyfriend may have been more problematic, because the attorneys
actually knew, rather than merely believed, that there was no basis for the claim. See
The Practice(ABC television broadcast, Oct.-Nov. 1998).
54. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1146 (discussing the propriety of
introducing alternative inferences into evidence); Subin, Further Reflections, supra
note 32, at 696-97 (arguing that while defense attorneys should be allowed to suggest
alternative inferences, they cannot, within the "monitor" role, be allowed to argue for
the truth of such inferences).
55. See, e.g., Luban, Criminal Defendants, supra note 27, at 1760-61 (contending
that the distinction "between forceful-but-honest advocacy and deception is so
artificial that it can never form the basis for drawing the magic moral line"); Mitchell,
supra note 27, at 346 (explaining that the raising of alternative inferences by defense
counsel represents nothing more than pointing out weaknesses in the prosecution's
case); Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1146 ("If the prosecution's own case does not carry
the necessary burden, the system demands a not guilty outcome, no matter how
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B. FalseAccusation of Criminal Conduct
Arguably, a more difficult question is posed by the attorneys'
actions accusing Steve Robin of his sister's murder. While the
accusations were in the form of leading questions and inferences, the
effect on Steve Robin's reputation and personal well-being were likely
significant.5 6 Do their obligations of zealous advocacy justify this
significant harm?
The classic Lord Brougham formulation tells lawyers that, in
representing a client, they "must not regard [with] alarm...
destruction which [they] may bring upon others."' This view suggests
that an attorney cannot be constrained in her representation of a
client by concern for others; her primary loyalty must be to her
client 8 At some level, this position is difficult to justify. From a
moral standpoint, using others as a means to an acquittal is
questionable,5 9 yet this is arguably what this conduct entails.
In some respects, blame attribution is similar to the hostile crossexamination of the truthful witness. In each situation, the attack on
the witness is not gratuitous; it is done with the "good" intention of
rebutting the government's case. 60 In each instance, the attorney is
significantly impugning the character, integrity and reputation of the
witness. Yet there is substantial authority that such cross-examination

erroneous that outcome might appear to those who 'know' the 'true' story.").
56. See supra note 15. False accusations of criminal conduct can have significant

adverse effects on the individual accused. See Joel Jay Finer, Therapists' Liability to
the Falsely Accused for Inducing Illusory Memories of Childhood Sexual AbuseCurrent Remedies and a Proposed Statute, 11 J.L. & Health 45, 64-65 (1996)

(examining false allegations in the context of child molestation charges); cf Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967) (discussing the impact of criminal charges
generally).
57. 18 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (1821); supra note 18 and accompanying text.
58. This position was recently espoused by Smith and Montross, who contend that
the virtue of fidelity requires that defense lawyers "go to the mat" for their clients,
even if this means attacking victims or witnesses. See Smith & Montross, supra note

17, at 523-30. While the attorney can have compassion for the person harmed, it
should not interfere with zealous advocacy. See id. at 529-30. They quote with
apparent approval language of Charles Curtis that the lawyer "is required to treat
outsiders as if they were barbarians and enemies." Id. at 518-19 (quoting Curtis, supra
note 17, at 5). For an interesting discussion of this issue, see chapter entitled -Casting

Guilt Upon the Innocent" in David Mellinkoff, The Conscience of a Lawyer 192-204

(1973).
59. See R. George Wright, Cross-Examining Legal Ethics: The Roles of Intention,
Outcomes, and Character, 83 Ky. LJ. 801, 810-14 (1994-95) (discussing Kant and
Nagel).
60. See id. at 813 (discussing the role of intentions and effects in determining the
morality of one who "intend[s] abuse and deception as a means to some further
desired goal, such as the acquittal of the client"). Arguably, cross-examination of a
prosecution witness is a more direct means of challenging the government's case, and
therefore justifies more aggressive advocacy than advancing the defendant's theory of
the case, but this is open to question. See supra note 45.
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is appropriate, 61 and by analogy, that the attribution of blame, such as
in "The Practice," is appropriate as well.
A serious argument can be advanced, however, against permitting
such conduct, at least when the client is known to be guilty. It may be
difficult to have confidence in a system that allows the attorney, under
the guise of responsibility to that system and in order to serve the
autonomy and dignity values of the defendant, to act in a manner that
dehumanizes an innocent individual by falsely suggesting that person
is responsible for a heinous crime. 62 This is easier to accept where the
client himself may be falsely charged. But where the client-defendant
is known to be guilty, and is participating with his attorney in an
attempt to avoid punishment and personal responsibility by
attempting to shift blame to another known to be innocent, it is not
surprising that the public has concerns.6 3 Moreover, many find it
difficult to accept that the systemic value in preserving the adversary
system to protect innocent defendants in other cases, or to ensure that
the awesome power of the state does not wrongfully take the liberty
or reputation of individuals in other cases, justifies allowing a guilty
defendant to avoid punishment and responsibility by significantly
harming
the autonomy and dignity of an innocent third party in this
64
case.

61. See Freedman, Understanding, supra note 18, at 167-68; Luban, Reply to
Ellmann, supra note 23, at 1031 ("In other criminal cases [other than rape] ... I would
(reluctantly) permit the brutal cross-examination of prosecution witnesses."). The
same considerations that are deemed to justify zealous defense generally provide
justification here. See generally supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing
Lord Broughman's view on zealous representation).
62. See Collett, supra note 45, at 464 ("[H]ow is human dignity enhanced by
facilitating a denial of responsibility by the client and denying the rights of
another?"). This might suggest that the client-centered justifications for aggressive
advocacy cannot support this conduct when a guilty defendant is involved. "The idea
that helping the accused escape substantively appropriate punishment through
aggressive defense serves individual dignity is hard to square with the legitimacy of
punishment after conviction. A viable ideal of dignity has to make room for respect
for the rights of others .... Simon, supra note 30, at 1714; see Collett, supra note 45,
at 464. Collett examines this client-centered justification in the context of a rape
hypothetical:
[T]he most troubling aspect of the rape hypothetical is that the lawyer is
required to 'respect' the dignity of the client who is lying by destroying the
dignity of the truthful prosecutrix.... Such assistance is required only if the
client's right is defined as an unqualified right to avoid punishment. But the
client does not have an unqualified right to avoid punishment.
Id.
63. See Baker, supra note 3, at 42-43. Whether and how public perceptions of this
type of conduct can and should be taken into account in the assessment of propriety is
itself a difficult question. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Public
Perception, Justice and the "Search for Truth" in Criminal Cases, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1267, 1300-02 (1996) (speculating on the direction that public opinion is likely to push
criminal lawyers and the "desirability of traveling down that particular road").
64. Several commentators have expressed concerns in this regard. See, e.g., Robert
P. Lawry, Cross-Examiningthe Truthful Witness: The Ideal Within the Central Moral
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The ultimate conclusion of this ethical analysis appears to be that
while there may be cases where blame-shifting behavior by criminal
defense lawyers simply goes too far, in most cases the adversary
system of criminal justice permits, and in some cases even requires,
attorneys to engage insuch behavior on behalf of their clients. While
there are those who believe a prohibition on such conduct may be
appropriate where a guilty client is involved and the attorney has no
basis to believe the truth of the blame-shifting allegations, as one
moves along a sliding scale of increasing doubt regarding client guilt
and increasing reason to believe the blame-shifting evidence, the
justifications, both institutional and situational, increase to where, at
some point, they likely render what would be permissible questioning
and argument mandatory based on the attorney's duty of zeal.
III. GUIDANCE FROM ETHICAL RULES AND STANDARDS
The conclusion above appears consistent with the three primary
sources of guidance for criminal defense attorneys, the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, 65 the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers,' and the ABA Standards Relating to the Defense
Function. 67 It is arguable that each of these sources would permit, but

not require, the questioning and argument that suggests that Steve
Robin may have killed his sister.
Tradition of Lawyering, 100 Dick. L. Rev. 563, 575 (1996) (considering it
"unconscionable to knowingly accuse an innocent person of a crime she did not
commit"); id. at 577 ("The innocent cannot be blamed."); id. at 580 (-1 suggest there
may be tactical advantages in casting the guilt on an innocent. Is that fair game...
?"); Richard H. Underwood, The Professionaland the Liar, 87 Ky. L Rev. 919, 937
(1998-99) ("False imputation of guilt during cross-examination would appear to be
prohibited...."). Many of those who believe in the strength of the systemic
justifications for aggressive advocacy are unwilling to draw distinctions regarding
acceptable zeal depending on the guilt or innocence of the client, at least in part
because the systemic justifications require zealous advocacy on behalf of the guilty to
keep the government honest in all cases, including those involving the innocent. See
Luban, Lawyers and Justice 151 (1988); see, e.g., Hodes, supra note 18, at 1077-78
(discussing O.J. Simpson's defense strategy).
65. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted by the American Bar
Association in 1983 and have been adopted in some form in most jurisdictions. Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Preface (1999).
66. The Restatement (Third) of the Law, The Law Governing Lawyers has been
in development by the American Law Institute since 1988. A final draft was
approved in principle and is expected to be in print sometime in the year 2000.
67. The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice include
standards for the defense and prosecution functions. The Standards for the Defense
Function were first adopted in 1971 and have been revised on several occasions. The
most recent version of Chapter 4, "The Defense Function," was approved by the
American Bar Association House of Delegates in 1991. See ABA Standards Relating
to the Defense Function Introduction (3d ed. 1993). The Standards are a product of
drafting and extensive review by representatives of all segments of the criminal justice
system. "They were adopted by the ABA in an attempt to ascertain a consensus view
of all segments of the criminal justice community about what good, professional
practice is and should be." Id.
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Initially, the decision regarding whether to explore an avenue of
defense and how to present it is largely a matter of tactics or
strategy.' This is reflected in Model Rule 1.2(a), which allocates
primary decision-making authority to the attorney with regard to the
way a case will be defended, subject to consultation with the client. 69
While the Commentary recognizes that "[a] clear distinction between
objectives and means sometimes cannot be drawn, 70 it provides that
"the lawyer should assume responsibility for technical and legal
tactical issues, but should defer to the client regarding.., concern for
third persons who might be adversely affected."'"
This Rule appears to allow the attorney some decision-making
authority with regard to means, but requires consultation with the
client, especially with regard to matters that affect third persons 72 or
"that directly affect the ultimate resolution of the case. ' 73 The
decision to cross-examine the victim's brother and argue that he was a
possible suspect, thereby purporting to shift blame to him, clearly
appears to be the type of tactical decision that requires consultation
with the client. Although the attorneys initially proposed the idea to
"Plan B" Steve Robin, they did consult with George Vogelman
regarding the presentation of this evidence. Although he was hesitant
to permit the examination,74 he ultimately agreed given the lack of
68. "Defense counsel has the ultimate responsibility for decisions related to
defense strategy and tactics, such as deciding 'which witnesses, if any, to call, and what
defenses to develop."' Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) at 61:416 (May 29,
1996) (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring)). "Historically, lawyers have been deemed to be the master of procedural
and tactical aspects of litigation. This inherent authority is derived from the lawyer's
expertise in strategy and procedure." Annotated Model Rules of Professional
Conduct 15-16 (4th ed. 1999); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 681
(1984) (stating that "strategic choices must be respected in these circumstances if they
are based on professional judgment.").
69. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a) (1999).
70. Id. Rule 1.2 cmt.
71. Id. It has been suggested that the Model Rules "offer inconsistent guidance on
the lawyer's control of the means used in a client's case," Rodney Uphoff & Peter
Wood, The Allocation of Decisionmaking Between Defense Counsel and Criminal
Defendant: An Empirical Study of Attorney-Client Decisionmaking, 47 U. Kan. L.
Rev. 1, 15 (1998), and that despite the suggestion that the lawyer should defer in
matters affecting third parties, "the vagueness of the ends/means test and the
inconsistencies in the Model Rules and its official comments leave the lawyer
basically free to decide this question as she sees fit." Id.
72. See id. Professor Freedman is critical of this Model Rule formulation for not
providing sufficient control to the client over decisions involving the rights of third
parties who might be adversely affected by litigation tactics. See Freedman,
Understanding, supra note 18, at 61-63.
73. Uphoff & Wood, supra note 71, at 15. The requirement of consultation with
the client is further supported by the duty of communication contained in Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.4.
74. In initially questioning the tactic, Vogelman indicated that he did not like
reading about himself in the papers and was not a "big fan of accusing people falsely."
See The Practice(ABC television broadcast, Oct.-Nov. 1998).
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viable alternatives.75 Thus, to this extent, the attorneys appear to have
acted in conformity with the Rules.
A similar conclusion is reached in analyzing the attorneys' conduct
under the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers.76 While the
Restatement does not focus specifically on tactics and strategies or
ends versus means in allocating decision-making authority, it provides
that a lawyer "may take any lawful measure within the scope of
representation that is reasonably calculated to advance a client's
objectives as defined by the client."' This gives the lawyer "broad
authority to make choices advancing the client's interests.""8 In
general, this authority includes "the initial decision concerning which
witnesses to call to testify at deposition or trial." 9 The Restatement
requires, however, that the lawyer keep the client "reasonably
informed about the matter [and] consult with [the] client to a
reasonable extent concerning decisions to be made by the
lawyer... ."' This appears to have been done in the meeting
between Ellenor Frutt, Eugene Young, and George Vogelman prior
to the implementation of Plan B.'
The ABA Standards' allocate to defense counsel "[s]trategic and
tactical decisions,"' indicating that such decisions should be made by
counsel "after consultation with the client where feasible and
appropriate."' Decisions regarding "what witnesses to call, whether
and how to cross-examine... and what evidence should be
introduced"' are explicitly allocated to the attorney "[b]ecause these
decisions require the skill, training and experience of the advocate."'
Unlike the Model Rules, the ABA Standards does not suggest
particular deference to the client on matters involving the rights of
third parties, but does encourage that decisions regarding witnesses
75. Frutt explained that the tactic was "risky," and in response to the client's
question, "Why do it?" she responded "We don't have anything else." Id.
76. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 32 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996).
77. Id. § 32(3).
78. Id.cmt. b. "[Tihe client may limit the lawyer's authority by agreement or
instructions." Id. No such limitation, however, was apparent in the Vogelman case.
79. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 166 cmt. c (Tentative
Draft No. 8, 1997).
80. See Restatement (Third) of the Lav Governing Lawyers § 31(1) (Proposed

Final Draft No. 1,1996).
81. See supra note 9.
82. "The standards are intended to be used as a guide to professional conduct and
performance." ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function Standard 4-1.1 (3d

ed. 1993). They are designed to provide "reasoned and appropriate professional
advice" and to "serve as a guide to what is deemed to be proper conduct." Id.
Standard 4-1.1 cmt.
83. Id. Standard 4-5.2(b).

84. d.
85. Id.
86. Id. cmt. (Strategy and Tactics).
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that can be anticipated sufficiently in advance be made on the basis of
consultation with the client.' Frutt and Young's discussion of Plan B
with George Vogelman would appear to be in accord with the
Standards as well.

What of the fact, however, that the questioning and arguments were
designed to create the arguably false impression that Steve Robin was

responsible for the death of his sister? Do the Rules prohibit
questioning or argument that creates this arguably false impression?
The Model Rule regarding Candor to the Tribunal, Rule 3.3, prohibits
attorneys from making false statements of material fact to the tribunal
or offering evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.' This Rule
prohibits an attorney from making an affirmative false statement of
89
fact and from participating in the presentation of perjured testimony;
however, it would appear that an attorney does not make a false
statement or offer false evidence when asking questions that lead to

truthful answers from a witness and then arguing those answers to
create possible inferences for the jury.9° While the inferences the
attorney urges may be "false" in the sense that they are known to be
false, or in this case strongly believed to be false, this conduct does not
87. See id.
88. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(a) (1999) provides, in part: "A
lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a
tribunal; ... or offer evidence the lawyer knows to be false." Id. Rule 3.3(a).
This Rule requires knowledge on the part of the attorney, which is defined in the
"terminology" section of the Rules as denoting "actual knowledge of the fact in
question." Id. Terminology. The section goes on to state, however, that "[a] person's
knowledge may be inferred from [the] circumstances." Id. It is arguable that Frutt
and Young did not "know" that George Vogelman was guilty, nor did they know that
Steve Robin had not, in fact, killed his sister, because they had no evidence that this
theory was not true. It is clear that, in having characterized Steve Robin as a "choir
boy" and in using "Plan B" itself, they believed he was not responsible. It is equally
arguable, however, that even without such evidence, their state of awareness and
belief caused them to "know" that there was no basis for the argument they were
advancing (that Steve Robin committed the crime) and therefore that they "knew"
the argument was false. See supra notes 46, 53.
89. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 353
(1987).
90. Whether such questioning and argument constitute false statements or the
offering of false evidence is a question that does not lend itself to an easy answer. On
the one hand, it is arguable that "false evidence" in Model Rule 3.3 relates only to
perjury and not to false implications from true facts. See 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. &
W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct § 3.3:208, at 593-95 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1998) (discussing the
definition of false evidence and a lawyer's ethical obligations); see also Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 12.3.4, at 642-43 (1986) (acknowledging that it is not
clear whether distortion of facts alone falls within the proscriptions of Rule 3.3).
Professor Wolfram notes that "[a]n early draft of the Model Rules would have
created an explicit obligation for lawyers to avoid creating misleading impressions
through advocacy," but finds that the failure to enact an explicit rule is not decisive.
Id. at 642 (citing Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1(a)(3) (Discussion
Draft 1980)); cf. Underwood, supra note 64, at 942-43 n.74 (appearing to question
whether literally true statements fall within the proscription of Rule 3.3).
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appear to rise to the level of a Rule 3.3 violation. 91
The Restatement provision, prohibiting lawyers from knowingly
making a false statement to a tribunal or offering testimony or other
evidence known to be false, is similar to Model Rule 3.3. 92 Like the
Model Rules, the Restatement is not clear on whether this prohibition
applies only to false evidence and testimony or to false implications
from true facts as well. The comments following illustration 5 do
provide some insight that would support the application of
Restatement § 180 only to actual false evidence and false statements
and not generally to false implications from true facts. The
commentary provides that "[a] lawyer may make conditional or
suppositional statements so long as they are so identified and are
neither known to be false nor made without a reasonable basis in fact
for their conditional or suppositional character." 93 This appears to
recognize the difference between an attorney's affirmative statements
and assertions made in the context of litigation. 91 The Restatement
provision appears to place a limitation on such conditional or
suppositional statements to the extent that they are neither known to
be false nor made without a reasonable basis. However, this would
not appear to apply in criminal litigation where, for purposes of
defending an individual charged wvith a crime, the attorney may
present a defense that requires the government to prove all elements
of the offense even where there is no reasonable basis for the

91. See Bruce A. Green, The CriminalRegulation of Lawyers, 67 Fordham L Rev.

327, 367-69 & n.176 (1998) (questioning whether counsel's arguments for a client

known to be guilty should be viewed as representations of fact and suggesting instead
that they are more properly viewed as assertions of the "client's legal position or
conclusions that arguably should be drawn from the facts"). Of course, it is not clear
that the Rule should be so limited, but no cases of discipline have been found under
Rule 3.3 involving false implications from true facts. Note, too, that Model Rule
8.4(c) makes it professional misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 8.4(c). One could argue that attempting to convince a jury that someone other
than the client committed the crime with which the client is charged, albeit by arguing
from "true" facts, when the lawyer knows such not to be the case is conduct involving
deceit and misrepresentation, yet lawyers are not disciplined under this Rule for such
conduct. It seems likely that understandings of what is within the range of
appropriate litigation conduct in criminal cases are incorporated into the
interpretation of this Rule.
92. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 180 (Tentative
Draft. No. 8, 1997).
93. Id. illus. 5.
94. The Restatement recognizes that
[i]t
may be difficult in practice to maintain the line between permissible
zealous argument about facts and inferences to be drawn from them and
impermissible personal endorsement. Latitude is left to the advocate in
doubtful cases, subject to the superintending power of the presiding officer
to prevent improper or misleading argument.
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 167 cmt. b (Tentative Draft
No. 8,1997).
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defense. 95

The ABA Standards have three sections that may have relevance to
the propriety of questions and argument creating a false impression of
blame on an innocent individual, such as Steve Robin. First, Standard
4-1.2 states that defense counsel "should not intentionally
misrepresent matters of fact or law to the court. 96 As with Model
Rule 3.3, the questions and arguments at issue do not constitute
assertions of "matters of fact" by counsel, and thus this section
appears not to control. Standard 4-7.5 is potentially more relevant
because it involves the presentation of evidence, stating that the
lawyer should not "knowingly... offer false evidence, whether by
documents, tangible evidence, or the testimony of witnesses.. ..

"I

It

would appear that Eugene did not offer false evidence because the
testimony he elicited from Steve Robin was truthful. Instead, only the
implications from this evidence were potentially false, but this appears
to be outside the scope of this Standard.
Standard 4-7.7 is likely the most relevant in this situation because it
provides that "in closing argument to the jury, [defense counsel] may
argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record."9' It
cautions, however, that defense counsel should not "intentionally...
misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may
draw." 99 Particularly relevant for our purposes is what this Standard
omits. The prior version had a provision stating that it was
"unprofessional conduct for a lawyer.., to attribute the crime to
another person unless such an inference is warranted by the
evidence." 1" The provision's 0 1 deletion"~ created the inference that
95. See id. § 170. See generally infra note 109 (discussing § 170(1) which creates an
exception for criminal defense lawyers).
96. ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function Standard 4-1.2(0 (3d ed.
1993).
97. Id. Standard 4-7.5(a).
98. Id. Standard 4-1.2.

99. Id.
100. ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function Standard 4-7.7(b) (2d ed.
1980).
101. The rationale for the rule was stated as follows:
The argument in a criminal case will sometimes include points based on
probabilities, but this is permissible only if those probabilities are supported

by the record or by common experience.

Counsel may not suggest, for

example, that the evidence is consistent with the probability that someone
other than the defendant committed the crime unless there is some basis in
the record for doing so.... The naming of a specific person other than the
defendant as the one responsible for the crime, however, is subject to an
important limitation. Since such a line of argument could lead to the
prosecution of the person named and, at least, may be destructive of the
person's good name and reputation, counsel should not make such an
argument unless there is reasonable ground in the evidence to support that

position.
Id. cmt.
102. See ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function Standard 4-7.7 (3d ed.
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such attribution of blame is no longer viewed as improper argument
even when not supported by the evidence. It would thus appear that
neither the questioning of Steve Robin nor the argument suggesting
his responsibility for the murder of his sister would constitute the
presentation of false evidence or misleading argument in violation of
the ABA Standards.0 3
In questioning Steve Robin and arguing the inferences from his
testimony to the jury, Young and Frutt advanced a theory that they
did not have a reasonable basis to believe was supported by the
evidence, namely that Steve Robin was responsible for the murder of
his sister. Does this constitute a violation of the Model Rules? Rule
3.1 provides that a lawyer "shall not... assert or controvert an issue
...unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous. ..."10' The
rule is qualified, however, in criminal cases. "A lawyer for the
defendant in a criminal proceeding. . . may nevertheless so defend the
proceeding as to require that every element of the case be
established."" 5 "This exception reflects the constitutional principle
that the state must prove every element of the crime charged and may
not, by procedural rule or otherwise, shift its burden to the
defendant."1" This provision allows the criminal defendant more
leeway in putting the government to its proof.07 It is axiomatic that
one element of the prosecution's proof is the defendant's identity as
the perpetrator of the crime."~ Evidence designed to suggest that
1993). No explanation is provided for this change, but it appears consistent with the
general tenor of the third edition, which places fewer restrictions on what is
considered acceptable conduct at trial. See bifra note 103.
103. This is particularly true in a case like the one under consideration, where the
attribution of blame is in part designed to demonstrate the weakness of the police
investigation rather than to have the jury believe that the other individual actually
committed the crime. The Commentary to Standard 4-7.8 specifically notes that
[t]here are often circumstances in which [defense] counsel may be entitled to
argue to the jury that they should draw an inference adverse to the
prosecution as the result of its failure to bring forth some particular item of
evidence or to call as a witness someone who has a special relation to the
facts of the case.
ABA Standards, Standard 4-7.8 cmt. (2d. ed. 1980). While it is ordinarily a
misrepresentation, and therefore improper, for counsel to argue such an inference
where evidence has been excluded, here the basis for absence of evidence
demonstrating that Steve Robin was not responsible for the crime was based on
alleged police failure to investigate, and thus the blame-shifting conduct is directly
related to the theory of defense. See id.Accordingly, it is unlikely that the argument
suggesting Steve Robin as the potential murderer would run afoul of this Standard.
104. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 (1999).
105. Id
106. Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 304 (4th ed. 1999).
107. Putting the government to its proof may require more than merely allowing
the defendant to create a reasonable doubt. It may require that the defendant have
the opportunity to present an alternative theory to the trier of fact. See supra note 45.
108. "An implied element that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the
prosecution under every criminal statute is that the defendant-not someone elsecommitted the offense." McCord, supra note 2, at 920. While, as Professor McCord
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someone else may have committed the offense, and that the
government did not adequately rule out other suspects, appears
clearly to constitute defending so as to require that every element be
established. Accordingly, it would appear that Rule 3.1 would not
preclude the questioning of Steve Robin or the argument that he may
have been the perpetrator and that the government failed to account
for this and other alternatives.
The Restatement provision regarding frivolous advocacy is virtually
identical to Rule 3.1.19 Restatement § 170 permits a lawyer for a
defendant in a criminal proceeding to "defend the proceeding to
require that the prosecution establish every necessary element."110
This is true "even if [the lawyer is] convinced that the guilt of the
offense charged can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt ....
The ABA Standards do not appear to directly address the issue of
frivolous claims. It thus appears that the absence of any support for
the belief that Steve Robin actually had any role in his sister's death
should not serve as an impediment to the questioning and argument
presented on the basis of frivolousness under either the Restatement
or the ABA Standards, making the attorneys' conduct permissible
under these provisions.
From the foregoing discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that
neither the fact that the questioning and argument, while based on
true facts, were designed to create a false impression, nor the fact that
there may not have been a non-frivolous basis for advancing the
theory that Steve Robin was responsible for his sister's death, would
cause the attorneys' conduct in this case to violate the relevant rules
and standards for attorney conduct. But what of the fact that the
questioning and argument had the effect of falsely accusing an
innocent person of a heinous crime, thereby causing damage to his
character and placing him in anguish and distress? Does such conduct
run afoul of the respect for the rights of third persons required by the
rules?
Model Rule 4.4 provides that, "[i]n representing a client, a lawyer
shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to
recognizes, doctrines such as accomplice liability, vicarious liability, and conspiratorial
liability can render a defendant liable for an act not personally committed, the
Vogelman case clearly did not involve such possibilities. See id. at 920-21 n.9. I, as
Professor McCord, will assume throughout this Article that the defendant would not
be liable under any of these theories, and instead that "the defendant claims that
some third person, for whose actions defendant is not criminally responsible,
committed the crime." Id.
109. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 170(1) (Tentative Draft
No. 8. 1997) provides: "A lawyer may not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous,
which includes a good-faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law."
110. Id. § 170(2).
111. Id. § 170 cmt. f.
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As stated in the

Comment, "[r]esponsibility to a client requires a lawyer to
subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that
responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of
third persons."" 3 While abusive treatment of witnesses can implicate
Rule 4.4,114 the Rule focuses on the "substantial purposes" of an
action rather than its effect. 115 Where the purpose is permitted,"b the
Rule appears to tolerate a high level of negative effect. Thus, if

Young and Frutt were acting with a permissible purpose and using
otherwise legal means to defend, the fact that their examination of

Steve Robin was humiliating and degrading would not likely, by itself,
lead to violation of Rule 4.4.117
The language of the Restatement is nearly identical to that of Rule
4.4.118 As currently formulated, the Restatement provides "[w]ide
112. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.4 (1999). This concept is also
embodied in the Preamble to the Model Rules, which states "A lawyer should use the
law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others."
Id. at Preamble. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the predecessor to
the Model Rules, prohibited an attorney from asking "any question that he has no
reasonable basis to believe is relevant to the case and is intended to degrade a witness
or other person." Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-106(c)(2) (1980).
113. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.4 cmt. The Lawyers' Manual on
Professional Conduct states:
A lawyer's principal duty is to the client, and is stated in affirmative
obligations such as loyalty, confidentiality, and diligence. However, a lawyer
also has obligations to the court and to third persons. These other
obligations temper the zeal with which a lawyer is permitted to represent the
client. They are often expressed negatively, as prohibitions against going too
far. Model Rule 4A, 'Respect for Rights of Third Persons,' collects many of
these prohibitions, but they may also be found throughout the Model Rules.
Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) at 71:101 (1993); see also Hazard &
Hodes, supra note 90, § 4.4:101, at 754 ("Rule 4.4 continues the theme of fairness in
advocacy by recognizing the rights of non-clients .... Such recognition is testimony to
the fact that lawyers are not supposed to be mere amoral hired guns; their role is
rather to fight for their clients as hard as need be, but fairly.").
114. See Hazard & Hodes, supra note 90, § 4.4:102, at 756 (-In litigation, it is often
the duty of an advocate to 'burden' or 'embarrass' an adverse witness during crossexamination, if doing so will make the witness less likely to be believed.... Legally,
the situation is probably no different where the examining lawyer knows that the
witness is telling the truth."); see also Freedman, Understanding, supra note 18, at 171
(explaining how the lawyer's duty to discredit the truthful witness is rooted in the
ethic of zealousness).
115. Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 424 (4th ed. 1999).
116. See Hazard & Hodes, supra note 90, § 4.4:102, at 756 (Although crossexamining the truthful witness "tends to move a trier of fact away from the truth
rather than toward it, the advocate may still point to a 'substantial purpose' other than
harassing the witness, namely winning the case at hand" (emphasis in original)).
117. In the Legal Background to this section found in the Annotated Model Rules,
with reference to cross-examining a truthful witness, the authors refer to the colloquy
between Mitchell and Subin on the right to present a false defense. See Annotated
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 426-27 (4th ed. 1999); supra note 32.
118. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 166(2) (Tentative
Draft No. 8, 1997). It adds the words "in a matter before a tribunal" immediately
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latitude... to advocates in examining an adverse witness.""' 9 The
Commentary recognizes that "some measure of embarrassment,
delay, and burden is inherent in litigation,' 2 but cautions that a
lawyer "may be subject to professional discipline for intimidating or
demeaning witnesses."'' While not directly addressing the propriety
of questioning that shifts blame, the Reporter's Notes to the
Restatement explicitly acknowledge, and perhaps implicitly approve,
the type of blame-shifting done by Young and Frutt. After noting that
"on the whole, courts seem to accept that cross-examination may be
made difficult and wearing on witnesses,"'2 the Notes compare "the
permissive stance of American law" to "British professional rules
[that] regulate a barrister more closely." 23 When conducting
proceedings at court, a practicing barrister "must not suggest that a
witness or other person is guilty of crime, fraud or misconduct or
attribute to another person the crime or conduct of which his lay
client is accused unless such allegations go to a matter in issue
(including the credibility of the witness) which is material to his lay
client's case and which appear to him to be supported by reasonable
grounds."'24 This discussion appears to suggest that American lawyers
are ethically permitted to do so even when these requirements are not
met.
The Restatement separately addresses the cross-examination of
witnesses'25 whose testimony the lawyer "knows to be truthful,
including harsh implied criticism of the witnesses's testimony,

after "in representing a client." This was likely designed to make clear that the section
applies to conduct in litigation. As noted by Hazard and Hodes, "[t]he placement of
Rule 4.4 in Part 4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (without a corresponding rule

in Part 3) was a minor error of draftsmanship, for it might create the impression that
Rule 4.4 is limited to out-of-court behavior. No such limitation was intended."
Hazard & Hodes, supra note 90, § 4.4:101, at 755.

119. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 166 cmt. c.
120. Id. § 166 cmt. e. While the Comment further states that "when an advocate
lacks a substantial purpose for conduct having those consequences, a disciplinary
offense occurs," this would not necessarily be the case in criminal defense because of

the lessened duty of the advocate regarding frivolous claims. Id. (citing § 170); supra
note 109 and accompanying text.

121. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 166 cmt. c.
122. Id. § 166 reporter's note, cmt. a.
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales, Rule 610(h)).
125. While the Vogelman case does not technically involve cross-examination

because the defense called Steve Robin, ostensibly for a different, limited purpose, he
was questioned as if on cross after Young had him declared hostile by the judge. See
The Practice (ABC television broadcast, Oct.-Nov. 1998).

Blame-shifting often

involves use of cross-examination to point fingers at others and, because the
defendant rarely just admits being the perpetrator, it may well involve the type of
embarrassment and intimidation discussed in the Comment. See Underwood, supra

note 64. The examination of Steve Robin is a good example. See The Practice (ABC
television broadcast, Oct.-Nov. 1998).
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character or capacity for truth-telling."' 1 The Commentary, which
does not appear particularly supportive of such conduct, notes that the
lawyer has discretion in this regard, and would presumably only do so
"where that would not cause the lawyer to lose credibility with the
tribunal or alienate the fact finder."'" This would appear to exist
where the only purpose is to degrade the witness, but could be true as
well where the trier of fact perceives the purposes behind the crossexamination to be clearly outweighed by its degrading nature.
The current tenor of the Restatement appears to be tolerant, but
not particularly supportive, of vigorous cross-examination of the
truthful witness.'s This position, however, is still under consideration.
Following the American Law Institute's 75th Annual Meeting, the
Reporters indicated that they "will consider discussing in more detail
cross-examination of the truthful witness" with particular focus on
distinguishing between the standard for such cross-examination in
criminal and civil cases. 29 The Restatement thus appears to reflect
some hesitation in continuing to allow the level of embarrassment and
burden on witnesses that the Model Rules now permit, although this
hesitation may reflect more serious concerns in civil rather than
criminal cases.
While the Restatement may be moving away from acceptance of a
broad license for attorneys to intimidate or degrade witnesses as long
as there is some legitimate purpose behind it, the ABA Standards
appear to be moving toward a greater willingness to tolerate and allow
such conduct, especially with regard to cross-examination of truthful
witnesses. While the proscription on using means "that have no
substantial purpose other then to embarrass, delay or burden a third
person"'130 was newly added to the third edition,"' the Standards have
always addressed the examination of witnesses and suggested that
"[the] interrogation of all witnesses should be conducted fairly,
objectively, and with due regard for the dignity and legitimate privacy
of the witness.. .."32 Moreover, because the Standards have always
addressed the cross-examination of witnesses known or believed to be
telling the truth, and it is here where the changes are most noticeable.
The first edition of the Standards provided that a "lawyer's belief
126. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 166 cmt. c.
127. Id
128. The Reporter's Notes indicate that "[d]iscussions of cross-examining a truthful
witness are found only in judicial dicta and academic scholarship and mainly concern
criminal defense counsel ... " Id.
129. The "summary is presented as a guide to actions taken with respect to the
drafts submitted at the Meeting" pending publication of the 1998 Proceedings.
Summary of Proceedings of the 75th Annual Meeting (visited Feb. 22, 2000)
<http./www.alLorg/ali/ACTIONS.HTM.>
130. ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function Standard 4-4.3(a) (3d ed.
1993).
131. "Section (a) is new to this Standard." Id. History of Standard.
132. Id. Standard 4-7.6(a).
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that the witness is telling the truth does not necessarily preclude
appropriate cross-examination in all circumstances, but may affect the
method and scope of cross-examination. 13 It further cautioned that
the lawyer "should not misuse the power of cross-examination or
impeachment by employing it to discredit or undermine a witness if he
The Commentary to
knows the witness to be testifying truthfully."''
this section was "lengthy and replete with ethical concerns,"'35
indicating that "'the high purpose' of cross-examination and
impeachment is to expose 'falsehood, not to destroy truth or the
reputation of a known truthful witness.'1 36 It appeared clear that,
while intimidating cross-examination designed to discredit a truthful
witness was not prohibited, it was clearly discouraged. 37
The second edition of the Standards "changed the operative
language of what became Standard 4-7.6 (b) by removing the second
sentence of the former provision. The language that admonished
criminal defense lawyers not to misuse cross-examination 'to discredit
The Standard
or undermine' the truthful witness was deleted ....,,13s
that remained provided that "[a] lawyer's belief or knowledge that the
witness is telling the truth does not preclude cross-examination, but
should, if possible, be taken into consideration by counsel in
conducting the cross-examination.' ' 39 This change appears to reflect' 4a0
"shift from an aspiration not to undermine truthful witnesses,"'
unless absolutely essential, to broad permission to do so' 4unless such
action can be avoided "without jeopardizing the defense.' '
133. ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function Standard 7.6(b) (1st ed.
1971).
134. Id.
135. Lawry, supra note 64, at 577.
136. Lawry, supra note 64, at 577 (quoting ABA Standards, Standard 7.6(b)
commentary).
137. Such conduct was viewed to "'so undermine[ ] the administration of justice
that it should be avoided."' Id. at 578 (quoting ABA Standards, Standard 7.6(b)).
138. Id. Professor Lawry notes that the language "was deleted because '[t]here are
some cases where, unless counsel challenges the prosecution's known truthful
witnesses, there will be no opposition to the prosecution's evidence, and the
defendant will be denied an effective defense." Id. (quoting ABA Standards Relating
to the Defense Function Standard 4-7.6(b) (2d ed. 1980)). While the Comment
indicates that "[i]f defense counsel can provide an effective defense for the accused
and also avoid confusion or embarrassment of the witness, counsel should seek to do
so," it acknowledges that "there unquestionably are many cases where defense
counsel cannot provide the accused with a defense at all if counsel is precluded from
engaging in vigorous cross-examination of witnesses either believed or known to have
testified truthfully." ABA Standards, Standard 4-7.6 commentary. In cases where the
lawyer "simply intends to put the state to its proof and raise a reasonable doubt,
skillful cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses is essential," and is therefore
permitted and perhaps required. Id.
139. ABA Standards, Standard 4-7.6(b).
140. Lawry, supra note 64, at 579.
141. ABA Standards, Standard 4-7.6 commentary. The concerns expressed in the
second edition relate more to tactical considerations and a concern for not
discouraging witnesses to come forward than to matters of "conscience and honor"
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The third edition goes even further. The current version of
Standard 4-7.6(b) removes the qualification suggesting that, "if
possible, counsel should take the fact that the witness is telling the
truth into account in determining whether and how to examine the
witness."'42 This clause was "deleted as inappropriate." '43 Now, the
Standard merely states that "defense counsel's belief or knowledge
that the witness is telling the truth does not preclude crossexamination."'" As noted by Professor Lawry, "[tihough some lip
service is paid to ethics, the commentary is written largely in terms of
tactics."'45 The attorney can cross-examine in a manner that will
demean or humiliate the witness as long as there is an available
tactical basis for doing so. 14 6 Under the current ABA Standards, it
would thus appear that Young and Frutt's conduct in questioning
Steve Robin in a vigorous manner that suggested he might have been
responsible for his sister's murder, and arguing that theory to the jury
despite their lack of any basis to believe it to be true, was appropriate
as long as it was tactically acceptable. 47
The foregoing discussion would indicate that nothing in the relevant
rules or standards precludes the blame-shifting examination and
argument in the Vogelman case. t48 But a significant question remains.
Do the Rules require that the lawyer engage in such conduct? At
least in the circumstances of this case, it appears the answer is no.
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility required that
lawyers "represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law."'49
The black-letter rule, however, held only that lawyers "shall not [fail]
to seek the lawful objectives of [their] client[s]."''5 9 The Model Rules
do not adopt the specific requirement of zeal. Rather, Rule 1.3
that pervaded the Commentary to the first draft. ABA Standards Relating to the
Defense Function Standard 7.6 commentary (lst ed. 1971). In fact, the second edition
quoted to Justice White's concurrence in Wade, ostensibly to demonstrate the ethical
propriety of this conduct. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
142- ABA Standards, Standard 4-7.6(b) (2d ed. 1980).
143. ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function Standard 4-7.6, History of
Standard (3d ed. 1993).
144. Id Standard 4-7.6(b).
145. Lawry, supra note 64, at 579.
146. Professor Lawry characterizes the change as follows: "Appeals to honor and
conscience are gone. In place of the lawyer's discretion and judgment is an
admonition to degrade, demean, invade, and insult if there is any tactical advantage to
be gained by the client." Id at 580.
147. In fact, Professor Lawry intimates, albeit somewhat sarcastically, this very
conclusion: "I suggest there may be tactical advantages in casting the guilt on an
innocent. Is that fair game, too?" Id.
148. This conclusion would appear to be the same even if the attorneys believed or
knew George Vogelman to be guilty. Nothing in the rules or standards appear to
distinguish on this basis.
149. Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7 (1980). This was one of
the "axiomatic norms" contained in the Code. See Annotated Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 26 (3d ed. 1996).
150. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-101.
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substitutes "reasonable diligence and promptness" for zeal.151 The
Commentary to the Rule does, however, suggest that "[a] lawyer
should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the
client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." 152 Rule 1.3
must be read in conjunction with Rules 1.1 through 1.4, requiring
competence, diligence, communication, and a duty to act within the
scope of the representation. Taken together, these rules provide a
duty to serve the client's legitimate interests. 5 3 This requirement

would not, however, appear to require the attorney to pursue any
particular tactics,"s and there is support for the proposition that,
"even over the objection of the client, a lawyer can present or refuse
to present certain witnesses... refuse to submit a defense as a matter
of trial expediency or tactics.., and decline cross-examination. 1 5 It
thus appears that the Model Rules, by their own terms, neither

mandate nor prohibit the blame-shifting conduct in the Vogelman
case.
The Restatement, too, focuses on the more particularized duties of

competence, diligence, and furthering the lawful objectives of the
client rather than on zeal.156 It suggests that the lawyer work with the
client in identifying objectives and deciding means to pursue them, but
is less clear in articulating if and when a lawyer must defer to the

151. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3. In fact, a proposal to revise
the Restatement so as to reflect that the Model Rules, like the Code, "require zeal as
a duty rather than merely an aspiration" was defeated at the 73rd Annual Meeting. 19
ALI Reporter 1, § 28, cmt. d. But see Freedman, Understanding, supra note 18, at 7273, 171 (suggesting that the commitment to zeal as a fundamental principle of
lawyering should be read into the Model Rules).
152. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3 cmt. 1.
153. See id. Preamble. ("As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's
position under the rules of the adversary system.").
154. "[A] lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that might be realized
for a client. A lawyer has professional discretion in determining the means by which a
matter should be pursued." Id. Rule 1.3 cmt. 1. See generally Albert W. Alschuler,
How to Win the Trial of the Century: The Ethics of Lord Brougham and the O.J.
Simpson Defense Team, 29 McGeorge L. Rev. 291 (1998) (discussing the lawyer's
discretion in pursuing adversarial tactics).
155. Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 21 (3d ed. 1996). This is true
"in both criminal and civil matters." Id.
156. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 28 (1)-(2)
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996). The Comment notes the reference in the Code to
a duty to act "'zealously' for a client" and characterizes this term as setting forth a
"traditional aspiration." Id. cmt. d. It goes on to say, however, that this "should not
be misunderstood to suggest that lawyers are legally required to function with a
certain emotion or style of litigating, negotiating, or counseling. For legal purposes,
the term encompasses the duties of competence and diligence." Id.; see also W.
Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1, 60 n.205 (1999) (citing to this provision to support the proposition that the
"Restatement recognizes that the word 'zealous,' which is used to refer to the lawyer's
obligation of loyalty, has been misused to justify unwarranted combativeness in
representing clients").
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7
client with regard to tactics the lawyer prefers not to pursue.15

Comment d states that "[a] lawyer is not required to carry out an
instruction... which the lawyer reasonably believes to be unethical or
similarly objectionable," 5 ' but continues that "a lawyer may not
continue a representation while refusing to follow a client's continuing
instruction."'5 9 In such situations, the lawyer may have a duty to

withdraw."6
This general conclusion is reinforced in a more concrete context by
the Comment to Restatement § 166, which states that "a lawyer has

discretion whether to cross-examine a witness with respect to
testimony the lawyer knows to be truthful," but "is never required to
conduct such examination, and the lawyer may withdraw if the
lawyer's client insists on such a course of action in a setting in which
the lawyer considers it imprudent or repugnant. 161 Of course, such
withdrawal may require approval of the tribunal. 1' Whether the
lawyer is required to present the option of this type of examination to
the client is not clear, but once the attorney has done so, the
Restatement appears to require that the lawyer follow the client's
instructions or withdraw.
The ABA Standards establish the "basic duty of defense counsel...
to serve as the accused's counselor and advocate with courage and
devotion and to render effective, quality representation." 1' 6 This
requires defense counsel's "zealous professional advocacy"" and
includes the "responsibility of furthering the defendant's interest to
the fullest extent that the law and applicable standards of professional

157. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 31-34 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996). Section 32(3) indicates that, for the most part, "a lawyer may take
any lawful measure within the scope of representation that is reasonably calculated to
advance a client's objectives as defined by the client ... ." Id. § 32(3). The Comment
indicates that the "lawyer begins with broad authority to make choices advancing the
client's interests. But the client may limit the lawyer's authority by agreement or
instructions." Id cmt. b.
158. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 32 cmt. d (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1996). This appears to be true even if it would not violate
professional rules or other law, since this is dealt with in the Comment in a previous
clause.
159. Id
160. "A lawyer may, after obtaining any required court permission, withdraw from
the representation if the instructions are considered repugnant or imprudent ... or
render the representation unreasonably difficult...." Id. Of course, this may be
difficult in a criminal defense context where counsel is appointed or where the issue
arises during trial.
161. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 166, cmt. c (Tentative
Draft No. 8,1997).
162. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing La\vyers, § 44(4) (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1,1996).
163. ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function Standard 4-1.2(b) (3d ed.
1993).
164. Id Standard 4-1.2.
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conduct permit.' 1 65 The Standards apportion to the lawyer the power
of decision in matters of trial strategy and tactics, including what
witnesses to call and how to examine. 66 The Comment to Standard 41.2 recognizes, however, that "our system of justice is inherently
contentious, albeit bounded by the rules of professional ethics and
decorum, and it demands that the lawyer be inclined toward vigorous

advocacy."' 67 Thus, "once a case has been undertaken, a lawyer is

obliged not to omit any essential lawful and ethical step in the
defense....""6
Finally, as do the Model Rules, the Standards
indicate that a lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage. 69
Taken together, these provisions would appear to require the attorney
to exercise discretion in choosing what strategies and tactics to use,
but to exercise that discretion in a manner that best advances the
client's objectives rather than the attorney's own interest.
Reference to the Standards' treatment of the cross-examination of
truthful witnesses reinforces this view. The Comment indicates that,
where no other defenses are available and such cross-examination is
necessary to put the government to its proof, the attorney may well
have an obligation to engage in such examination. 7 ' "Indeed, were
counsel in the circumstance to forego vigorous cross-examination of
the prosecution's witnesses, counsel would violate the clear duty of
zealous representation that is owed to the client. 171 This is
immediately followed by the statement that "the mere fact that
defense counsel can, by use of impeachment, impair or destroy the
credibility of an adverse witness does not impose upon counsel a duty
to do so."172 In giving guidance on this issue, however, the Comment
speaks only in terms of whether the tactic is in the client's best
interest, 73 and it would appear that if it is, the attorney may well have
an obligation to proceed with the cross-examination or withdraw.
IV. EVIDENTIARY LIMITATIONS ON BLAME-SHIFTING: THE DIRECT
CONNECrION DOCTRINE

The discussion of the ethical propriety and permissibility of blameshifting behavior by criminal defense lawyers under the relevant rules
and standards of professional conduct leads to the conclusion that, at
least in some cases, such behavior is permitted, and perhaps even
165. Id.
166. See id. Standard 4-5.2(b) & cmt.; see also supra notes 66-87 and accompanying
text (discussing the treatment of attorney and client roles in bringing a defense and

cross-examination).
167. ABA Standards, Standard 4-1.2 cmt (3d ed. 1993).
168. Id.
169. See id. Standard 4-1.3 cmt.

170. See id. Standard 4-7.6. cmt.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See id.
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required. While, as noted, defense lawyers and scholars may well
disagree, it seems fair to conclude that most commentators would
accept that a criminal defense lawyer is ethically permitted to engage
in blame-shifting activity, at least where the attorney does not know
the client to be guilty and where there is a non-frivolous factual basis
for the blame-shifting allegations."
While there is still potential
concern for the fights of the third person to whom blame is to be
shifted, where there is a non-frivolous basis for the claim, it is hard to
justify telling a criminal defendant who similarly asserts innocence
that a third person's rights outweigh his or her right to present a
defense. Yet, interestingly, in most jurisdictions, this does not appear
to be the law.
Rules of evidence in a majority of jurisdictions prohibit the
introduction of alternative perpetrator evidence unless there is a
"direct connection" established between the evidence and the crime.
Because an attorney's zeal on behalf of the client must be exercised
within the "bounds of the law"'75 and attorneys must comply with
rules of procedure and evidence in the course of representing their
clients, 76 these rules likely prevent attorneys in many cases from

engaging in blame-shifting conduct that appears ethical and
appropriate.'n What accounts for this apparent disjunction between
conclusions based on ethical analysis and what the law of evidence
requires? In light of the analysis of the ethical propriety of this
conduct, are these restrictive rules justified?
This Article contends that they are not. As the remaining section
will show, the direct connection doctrine is inconsistent with our
understanding of the role of the criminal defense lawyer in the
adversary system of criminal justice, unduly restricts defendants'
constitutional rights, and increases the risk of erroneous conviction of
innocent defendants both in individual cases and on a systemic basis.
Accordingly, this rule should be changed.
The direct connection doctrine is an evidentiary rule that prohibits
a defendant from introducing evidence to show that someone other
than the defendant (an alternative perpetrator) may have committed
the offense for which the defendant is charged unless the defendant
can establish a direct connection between the alternative perpetrator
174. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
175. Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7 (1980); supra note 149

and accompanying text.
176. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(c) (1999).

177. Of course, an attorney can offer evidence she reasonably believes to be
admissible, see Model Rule 3.4(e), and can make a good faith argument for change in
the law (to admit evidence that otherwise would be inadmissible). See Model Rules of

Professional Conduct Rule 3.1. The evidence must be proffered to obtain judicial
consideration and preserve the issue for appellate review. This generally requires
making an offer of proof. See Fed. R. Evid. 103; McCormick on Evidence § 51 (John
W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
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and the offense. 178 Although the language used by jurisdictions
varies,17 9 the direct connection doctrine provides a preliminary
evidentiary hurdle for a defendant who seeks to affirmatively offer
evidence or engage in cross-examination'80 that purports to identify
another person as the potential perpetrator of the crime.181
In effect, the direct connection doctrine substantially limits, and in
many cases completely prevents, a defendant who says "not me" from
attempting to answer the question "then who?" The doctrine
considers evidence inadmissible that would serve to shift blame to a
third party "if it simply affords a possible ground of suspicion against
such person.""8 In order to be admissible, any evidence of motive or
opportunity "must be coupled with substantial evidence tending to
directly connect that person with the actual commission of the
offense."18' 3 The proffered evidence must not only raise a reasonable

inference of the defendant's innocence, but must also "directly
connect the other person with the corpus delicti."'8 Courts use
various formulations to characterize the nature of the "nexus""', or
"link" '86 required between the third person and the crime,' 7 but in
178. See McCord, supra note 2, at 921.
179. See id. at 926 nn.39-40; see also infra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
180. The direct connection doctrine applies to testimony elicited on direct or crossexamination as well as to non-testimonial evidence offered to prove the guilt of a
third party.
181. There may be other hurdles when alternative perpetrator evidence is offered,
including issues of hearsay and other bad act evidence under Rule 404(b). See
McCord, supra note 2, at 977-82 (discussing the general ban on character evidence as
well as one of the large exceptions to that ban); see, e.g., Joan L. Larsen, Comment,
Of Propensity, Prejudice, and Plain Meaning: The Accused's Use of Exculpatory
Specific Acts Evidence and the Need to Amend Rule 404(b), 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 651,
692-95 (1993) (proposing an amendment to Rule 404(b) that acknowledges the
situation of an accused seeking to introduce evidence of a third person's specific acts
to exculpate himself); Dennis Prater and Tammy M. Somogye, Comment, Some Other
Dude Did It (But Will You Be Allowed To Prove It?), 67 J. Kan. B. Ass'n, May 1998,
at 28-29 (discussing the admissibility of bad act evidence under the alternative
perpetrator defense). These issues are beyond the scope of this Article.
182. State v. Rabellizsa, 903 P.2d 43, 46 (Haw. 1995) (quoting People v. Green, 609
P.2d 468, 480 (Cal. 1980)).
183. Id. (citation omitted). Courts explain that "[u]nless that direct connection
exists, it is within 'the sound discretion of the trial court to refuse to admit such
evidence when it simply affords a possible ground of possible suspicion against
another person."' State v. Harris, 711 A.2d 769, 775 (Conn. App. 1998) (quoting State
v. Payne, 591 A.2d 1246, 1259 (Conn. 1991)).
184. Santana v. State, 510 S.E.2d 916, 917 (Ga. App. 1999) (quoting Klinect v.
State, 501 S.E.2d 810, 814 (Ga. 1998)). It is also sufficient if the evidence shows "that
the other person has recently committed a crime of the same or similar nature." Id. at
917.
185. Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1, 5 (D.C. App. 1996).
186. Pyles v. State, 947 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Ark. 1997).
187. These formulations range from "direct connection," Santana, 510 S.E.2d at
917; State v. Clark, 859 S.W.2d 782, 788 (Mo. App. 1993); State v. Grega, 721 A.2d
445, 454 (Vt. 1998), to "inherent tendency," State v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 227, 233
(Minn. 1999) (quoting State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150, 159 (Minn. 1997)), to
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each case, there must be an actual connection between the individual
and the crime itself.l" The degree of connection also varies, with
some courts requiring
only "some evidence,"''1 9 and others
"substantial evidence." 19 In some instances, courts require that the
evidence be such as "to clearly implicate someone besides the accused
as the guilty person,"19' or "clearly to point to another, rather than the
accused."'' l
The direct connection doctrine has been applied to prevent
introduction of blame-shifting evidence in a wide variety of cases.1 93
Because the doctrine leads to exclusion of evidence that an alternative
perpetrator had the motive and means to commit the crime absent
' ' exclusion has
"direct evidence placing the third party at the scene,"1
been deemed appropriate in cases with strong evidence of motive or
opportunity. Thus, the fact that the alternative perpetrator may have
made threats against the victim,195 or was seen with blood on his hands
in the vicinity of the crime,19 or had assaulted the victim two weeks
before the crime," have been deemed insufficient in the absence of
evidence clearly linking the alternative perpetrator to the actual crime
itself.19 As the cases demonstrate, without such a link, no evidence
"legitimate tendency," Rabellizsa, 903 Pl.d at 46; State v. Denny, 357 N.W.2d 12, 17
(Wis. 1984).
188. An additional formulation states that "such evidence is inadmissible unless it
points directly to the guilt of the third party." Pyles, 947 S.W.2d at 757 (quoting State
v. )Wilson, 367 S.E.3d 589,600 (N.C. 1988)).
189. See State v. Harris, 711 A.2d 769, 775 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998); Denny, 357
N.W.2d at 17.
190. Denny, 357 N.W.2d at 16; Rabellizsa, 903 P.2d at 46. Additionally, some
courts require a "reasonable possibility formulation [to] govern the relevance decision
in the case of evidence of third-party perpetration." Winfield, 676 A.2d at 5.
191. Clark, 859 S.W.2d at 788.
192. Romano v. State, 847 P.2d 368,381 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
193. See McCord, supra note 2, at 948-72 nn.153-250. Professor McCord
documents 240 cases involving alternative perpetrator evidence between 1976 and
1996 and attempts to categorize the cases to better understand how courts rule in such
cases. He identifies six categories of evidence and eventually concludes that,
analyzing the strength of each type of evidence and the combination of categories of
evidence offered, it is possible to predict whether evidence will be admitted based on
ten general predictive principles. See id. at 938-63. He concludes that a trial court's
decision to exclude alternative perpetrator evidence will be upheld in almost 80% of
cases, and that there are only three categories in which evidence is likely to be
admitted. See id at 947.
194. State v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 227,234 (Minn. 1999).
195. See e.g., State v. Robinson, 628 A.3d 664, 667 (Me. 1993) (explaining that such
statements would be admissible to reasonably establish a link between the alternative
perpetrator and victim).
196. See State v. Luna, 378 N.W.2d 229,232 (S.D. 1985).
197. See State v. Stokes, 638 S.W.2d 715, 723 (Mo. 1982). The alleged alternative
perpetrator was the victim's former boyfriend and his fingerprints were found in her
apartment after the crime. See id&
198. As the Supreme Court of Minnesota noted in a fairly typical passage, -[iln
cases in which we have upheld or required the admission of evidence of other bad acts
by a third party, there always has been some direct evidence placing the third party at
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tending to show motive, opportunity, or commission of prior serious
crimes will make its way to the jury.199
Returning to the Vogelman scenario, it seems clear that the
alternative perpetrator evidence that was introduced in that case
would not have been admissible in most jurisdictions. The evidence
and argument regarding Steve Robin related solely to motive and
opportunity. In most jurisdictions, this alone would have been fatal. 00
The absence of any evidence whatsoever linking Steve Robin to the
crime itself would have precluded the entire line of examination
designed to set up the "Plan B" blame-shift. This conclusion is likely
the same under Professor McCord's analysis as well because the
motive evidence would likely have been characterized as weak to
moderate20 l and the opportunity evidence was likely weak as well.2°
Thus, in almost every direct connection jurisdiction, the prosecution's
objection to this line of questioning, which showed
merely motive and
2°4
opportunity, 203 would likely have been sustained.
the scene of the charged crime." Williams, 593 N.W.2d at 234. Other courts will
permit alternative perpetrator evidence where there is "direct or circumstantial
evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime." Pyles v.
State, 947 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Ark. 1997) (quoting People v. Kaurish, 802 P.2d 278, 29596 (Cal. 1990)).
199. See State v. Umfrees, 433 S.W.2d 284, 288 (Mo. 1968) ("Disconnected and
remote acts, outside the crime itself cannot be separately proved" and are
inadmissible).
200. See, e.g., Pyles, 947 S.W.2d at 757 ("'[E]vidence of mere motive or opportunity
to commit the crime in another person, without more, will not suffice ....

"

(quoting

Kaurish,802 P.2d at 805).
201. See McCord, supra note 2, at 942. This characterization is based on that fact
that, although he had some need for money and would inherit more if his sister were
dead, there was nothing to indicate he was sufficiently desperate that he would kill his
sister in order to eventually inherit more. Professor McCord considered evidence of
motive "strong" if the alternative perpetrator had recently threatened the victim or if
there were other "easily inferable powerful impulses" such as to cover up a crime or
retaliate for criminal or sexual misconduct by the alternative perpetrator. Id. "Weak"
motive evidence tended to be remote, incommensurably slight compared to the
gravity of the offense, or manifested a general dislike of the victim. Id. at 942-43.
Anything in between was characterized as "moderate." See id. at 943. While the
nature of the motive could, in some cases, have made it strong, the lack of
commensurability to murder significantly undercuts that characterization. See id.
202. See id. at 940-42. Similarly, although Young tried to imply that Steve Robin
could have followed his sister and discovered where she had gone with George
Vogelman, there was no actual evidence of opportunity to commit the crime.
According to Professor McCord, to be "strong," alternative perpetrator evidence had
to place the person at the scene of the crime at the time of commission. See id. at 940.
Opportunity evidence was considered "weak" when it showed no more than that the
named person could have been in the general vicinity at the time of the crime. See id.
at 941. Cases in the middle were considered "moderate." See id. at 942. Although
Young speculated that Robin could have followed his sister or otherwise have
determined where she had gone the night of the killing, the evidence of opportunity
clearly falls in the weak category.
203. The fact that the evidence was offered in part to prove the police failure to
investigate does not alter this result. Courts do not distinguish the use to which the
alternative perpetrator evidence will be put. If it is evidence that tends to cast blame
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While the direct connection doctrine is both frequently applied and
long-standing, little scholarly attention was paid to it until Professor
McCord's major article in 1996 in which he documented the history of
the doctrine and its extensive use by jurisdictions around the
country.'
As Professor McCord illustrated, the direct connection
doctrine has a long history and dates back at least into the middle of
the nineteenth century.2°6 The doctrine "made slow but steady
progress during the first half of the twentieth century."' 1 By 1950, it
was a "freestanding principle of criminal and evidence law" that
"came to dominate" American jurisprudence.'
Despite challenges
beginning in the late 1960s based on the emerging constitutional right
of a criminal defendant to put on a defense, °w it has survived relatively
intact in most jurisdictions 10 and continues to be used on a regular
on another, it is subject to the direct connection doctrine.
204. This would at least appear to be true based on evaluation of reported cases.
However, it is difficult to know the extent to which appellate cases on this issue reflect
the whole universe of cases in the trial courts, since only those cases in which the
evidence is excluded are likely to ever be seen by an appellate court. See id. at 947. It
is unclear whether, in ruling on evidentiary issues, trial judges are more likely to err
on the side of the defendant to avoid review and reversal or on the side of the
government to preserve reviewability of their rulings. Compare Miran Damaska,
Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A
ComparativeStudy, 121 U. Pa. L Rev. 506, 520 & n.2 (1973) (suggesting trial judges
may have a government bias in ruling on close cases in order "to preserve
reviewability"), with Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some
Consequences of the Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. Chi. L Rev. 1, 38-42
(1990) (suggesting a pro-defense bias is more likely if the judges' desire is to avoid
reversal). An accurate picture of how the doctrine is actually applied in the trial
courts thus cannot be obtained solely through examination of appellate cases; it would
require information from the trial courts.
205. See McCord, supra note 2, at 921-38.
206. See id.
at 921-25. Professor McCord identifies State v. May, 15 N.C. (1 Dev.)
328 (1833), as the earliest alternative perpetrator case he found. McCord, supra note
2, at 921.
207. Id. at 926.
20& Id. Professor McCord notes that, while the direct connection doctrine is
prominent, there are two alternative approaches. One is an "aberrant" version of the
doctrine in three states that allows a defendant to offer alternative perpetrator
evidence only if the government's case is circumstantial. The second is the "capableof-raising-a-reasonable-doubt" approach. This is based on Professor Wigmore's view
that alternative perpetrator evidence should be admitted without special
requirements, but as Professor McCord notes, those jurisdictions using Professor
Wigmore's terminology do not share his view of admissibility and generally apply a
version of the direct connection doctrine under the guise of this language. See id.at
926-29.
209. See id. at 929-30, nn.52-53 (discussing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967);
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974); and Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987)).
210. This is not to suggest that the doctrine is universally accepted. As Professor
McCord notes, eight jurisdictions seem to rely solely on the standard balance of
probative value versus prejudicial effect, three use the capacity-to-create-areasonable-doubt test without imposing a requirement of direct connection, and one
rejects the doctrine as setting too high a standard. Id. at 936-38 & nn.103-05. Recent
cases, too, confirm that some jurisdictions reject the doctrine and allow alternative
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basis. 1
The stated justifications underlying the direct connection doctrine
relate largely to the orderly administration of trials.212 "The asserted
rationale of [the rule] is 'to place reasonable limits on the trial of
collateral issues... and to avoid undue prejudice to the [government]
from unsupported jury speculation as to the guilt of other
suspects.' 23 While some courts have viewed this as a question of
relevance2 14 and have held that evidence which is merely speculative
does not have a "legal tendency to establish the innocence" of the

perpetrator evidence to be admitted under the same standards as any other evidence
offered at trial. See, e.g., State v. Fulston, 738 A.2d 380,384 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1999) ("To be admissible, the third party evidence need not show substantial proof of
a probability that the third person committed the act; it need only be capable of
raising a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt."). A recent case established a
"reasonable possibility" standard in lieu of direct connection, a standard that is much
easier for the defendant to meet. See Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1, 5 (D.C.
App. 1996). Not surprisingly, such evidence is more likely to be admitted in these
jurisdictions. See Fulston,738 A.2d at 384-85.
211. See McCord, supra note 2, at 929-30. According to Professor McCord, 36
jurisdictions have enough case law regarding alternative perpetrator evidence to
support thorough analysis, and of those, twenty-five adhere at least in part to the
doctrine. See id. at 936-37. Since Professor McCord did his analysis, at least three
jurisdictions he listed as not setting forth standards have done so, and each has
adopted a version of the direct connection test. See Pyles v. State, 947 S.W.2d 754, 757
(Ark. 1997) (adopting requirement that a link must be shown between the alleged
perpetrator and the crime before admitting evidence incriminating a third party):
State v. Rabellizsa, 903 P.2d 43, 47 (Haw. 1995) (adopting the "legitimate tendency"
version of the test); Commonwealth v. Maddox, 955 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Ky. 1997)
(upholding a limitation on cross-examination of witnesses designed to shift blame on
the ground that an insufficient connection had been established between the crossexamination and the facts in evidence, however, not explicitly adopting the test). It
thus appears that a majority of jurisdictions recognize some version of the direct
connection doctrine. See also Smithart v. State, 988 P.2d 583, 587 (Alaska 1999)
(stating that the concerns underlying the direct connection doctrine "have led
virtually every state to require some kind of preliminary evidentiary showing before
allowing introduction of alternative-perpetrator evidence").
212. See State v. Luna, 378 N.W.2d 229, 234 (S.D. 1985). The court recognizes that
interest as substantial and the interest in "reliable and efficient trials" to be
compelling. Id.at 233; see also State v. Scheidell, 595 N.W.2d 661, 671 (Wis. 1999)
("The state has a significant interest in preserving orderly trials."). It is interesting
that the courts rarely discuss the concern regarding the rights of the alleged third
party perpetrator. For examples of a few isolated instances in which courts have done
so, see State v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 227, 233 (Minn. 1999) (stating that the doctrine
"safeguards the third person from indiscriminate use of past differences with the
deceased" (quoting State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150, 159 (Minn. 1977)); State v.
Braddock, 452 N.W.2d 785,790 (S.D. 1990) (same).
213. Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1453 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting People v. Green,
609 P.2d 468,480 (Cal. 1980)).
214. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 711 A.2d 769, 775 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998) (stating
"[t]he admissibility of evidence of third party culpability is governed by the rules
relating to relevancy"); Quinn v. State, 25 P.2d 711, 714 (Okla. Crim. App. 1933)
(stating that evidence must clearly point to another). This is likely wrong. See
McCormick on Evidence § 185 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
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accused, 215 courts now generally recognize that the issue is more
21 6
properly one of the balance between probative value and prejudice.
In fact, the concerns expressed by the courts in justifying the
exclusion of alternative perpetrator evidence-that it risks distracting
the jury from the issue of defendant's guilt,2 7 that it will cause juror
confusion,21s and that it will lead to waste of judicial resources' 9-are
similar or identical to the considerations used under Rule 403 o to
balance probative value and prejudicial effect. Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 "codifies the common law power of the judge to exclude
relevant evidence 'if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.'" In fact, the direct
connection doctrine may well be a specialized version of the Rule 403
balance applicable in alternative perpetrator cases."'
215. Quinn,25 P.2d at 714.
216. See, e.g., Hinds v. State, 469 N.E.2d 31, 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing
that "a reasonable argument can be made" that the requirement that evidence
"should not be admitted where its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial
effect" is "the same standard of admissibility [that] should govern evidence of similar
crimes by persons other than the defendant, offered ... to prove his innocence");
Maddox, 955 S.W.2d at 721 (requiring the trial judge to determine that the probative
value of such evidence is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect before allowing
admission of such evidence); State v. Garza, 563 N.W.2d 406, 410-11 (S.D. 1997)
(noting that the court must balance between having orderly trials and excluding
prejudicial evidence); State v. Grega, 721 A.2d 445, 454 (Vt. 1998) (stating that third
party evidence may be excluded when the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion
substantially outweighs its probative value); see also McCord, supra note 2, at 974-77
(comparing probative value with countervailing considerations).
217. See Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1, 5 (D.C. 1996); Perty, 713 F.2d at
1453-54.
21& See Hinds, 469 N.E.2d at 38 ("[U]nder a less restrictive rule, a defendant could
confuse the jury with a plethora of evidence suggesting-but not really shoing-that
any number of other persons might have committed the crime charged.").
219. See Marrone v. State, 359 P.2d 969, 984 & n.19 (Alaska 1961) (citing People v.
Perkins, 59 P.2d 1069, 1074-75 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936)). The direct connection
doctrine
rests upon the necessity that trials of cases must be both orderly and
expeditious, but they must come to an end, and that it should be a logical
end. To this end, it is necessary that the scope of inquiry into collateral and
unimportant issues must be strictly limited ... [otherwise], a great many trial
days might be consumed in the pursuit of inquiries which could not be
expected to lead to any satisfactory conclusion.
Id. at 984 n.19; see also State v. Luna, 378 N.W.2d 229, 234 (S.D. 1985) (noting that
exclusion is appropriate to avoid "unduly tying up the court process").
220. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
22L See McCormick, supra note 214, § 185, at 644.
222. See McCord, supra note 2, at 975 ("The direct connection doctrine is really a
specialized application of the balance between probative value and countervailing
considerations at the preliminary fact stage."); see also Smithart v. State, 946 P.2d
1264, 1276 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 988 P.2d 583 (Alaska
1999) ("[The] rule is, in essence, an attempt to apply this balancing of probative value
against prejudicial impact in the specific context of evidence offered to show that a
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The direct connection doctrine, although purportedly designed to
increase trial efficiency, in reality impairs a defendant's right to
present a defense, interferes with the right to trial by jury, and
undercuts the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moreover, it increases the risk of convicting an innocent person. By
substituting a mechanistic determination for the necessary balance of
probative value and prejudicial effect, it runs dangerously close to
violating a defendant's constitutional rights.
Initially, the direct connection doctrine is inconsistent with our
adversary system of criminal justice. The criminal justice system
requires that the government shoulder the burden of proving a
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt while affording the
defendant a right to present a defense?2
While the right is not
absolute, 4 it encompasses the ability to advance any legitimate
theory of defense and to present evidence necessary to support that
theory without undue interference.' The direct connection doctrine
unduly impairs both aspects of this right. It totally prevents a
defendant from introducing evidence to advance an alternative
perpetrator theory of defense unless the defendant can overcome a
high preliminary hurdle by showing a direct connection. 6 In doing
so, the doctrine totally excludes relevant defense evidence from
consideration by the jury.227
third party committed the crime."); State v. Wooten, 972 P.2d 993, 1000 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1999) ("The 'inherent tendency' test is little more than the application of these
rules [401 and 403] to that category" of evidence.).
223. See, e.g., Washington v. State, 737 So. 2d 1208, 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
("The constitutional guarantees of due process provide for the admission of evidence
relevant to the defense of the accused, and it is clear that '[flew rights are more
fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense."'
(quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973))); State v. Scheidell, 595
N.W.2d 661, 666 (Wis. 1999) (recognizing that a defendant's right to cross-examine
witnesses and to present witnesses in his or her own defense are fundamental and
essential to a fair trial).
224. See Scheidell, 595 N.W.2d at 666.
225. See, e.g., Smithart, 988 P.2d at 586-87 (noting that when evidentiary rules
interfere with a defendant's right to present a defense, such defendant's due process
rights are violated); State v. Luna, 378 N.W.2d 229, 239 (S.D. 1985) (Henderson, J.,
dissenting) ("The accused 'is entitled to have the jury consider any theory of the
defense which is supported by law and which has some foundation in the evidence,
however tenuous."' (citations omitted)).
226. See McCord, supra note 2, at 984 (expressing concern that, due to the
requirement of the judge's preliminary ruling and the "coincidence problem" it
creates, "in an aaltperp case, where the judge cannot direct a verdict for the
prosecution.., the jury never gets to hear evidence of and consider the defendant's
aaltperp defense, which is likely to be the defendant's primary argument for
acquittal").
227. As Professor McCord notes, this "coincidence problem," where the judge
must rule on the very issue that is to be presented to the jury, "is at least
troublesome" in that "the judge's opinion on a single fact question that affects both
admissibility and the merits might control the outcome of the case. The most
dramatic possibility is that the jury never gets the case because the judge decides such
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The direct connection doctrine improperly shifts the focus of
admissibility from whether the evidence sought to be offered has a
tendency to negate the defendant's guilt to how effectively it proves

the guilt of the alternative perpetrator

m

In doing so, it substitutes a

mechanical determination of connection for the careful balancing of

probative value and legitimate prejudicial effect that is normally
necessary to exclude relevant evidence helpful to the defense.

This use of a mechanistic surrogate for the proper inquiry in
determining admissibility of defense evidence may well involve the
type of "a prioricategor[y] '' 2 9 that should not withstand constitutional
scrutiny. While courts have reversed exclusion of alternative
perpetrator evidence at least in part because of this concern about the
doctrine's impact on the defendant's right to present a defense in
particular cases,m no court has yet held the doctrine itself to be
unconstitutional. 231 It is arguable, however, that strict application of
the direct connection doctrine may violate the constitutional right of
the criminal defendant to put on a defense.
The Supreme Court has held that criminal defendants must be

afforded "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense."' z
This right, however, is not without limits, and it "may, in appropriate

cases, [be required to] bow to accommodate other legitimate interests
in the criminal trial process."" 3 An accused may be required to
"comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to
a fact question...." Id at 984 (quoting Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C.
Kirkpatrick, Evidence 43 (1995)).
228. This point has been recognized by several courts in rejecting or limiting the
application of the doctrine:
[T]he crucial issue is whether other-suspect evidence calls the defendant's
guilt into question: "There is no requirement that the proffered evidence
must prove or even raise a strong probability that [the third party]
committed the offense. Rather, the evidence need only tend to create a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense.... [O]ur focus
is on the effect the evidence has upon the defendant's culpability and not the
third party's culpability."
Smithart, 583 P.2d at 588 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 552 A2d 513, 517 (D.C.
1989)).
229. Katherine Goldwasser, Vindicating the Right to Trial By Jury and the
Requirement of Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt. A Critique of the Conventional
Wisdom About Excluding Defense Evidence, 86 Geo. L.J. 621,628 (1998).
230. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The
trial court erred in excluding evidence which indicated that another man may have
committed" the crime.); Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246, 257-58 (D.C. App.
1997) (citing cases that were reversed due to the exclusion of extrinsic evidence
impeaching a third party where the rationale for such reversal wvas that the
defendant's right to present a defense had been curtailed).
231. See McCord, supra note 2, at 930 ("Indeed, no appellate court has ever held,
or even intimated, that the direct connection doctrine is itself unconstitutional.").
232. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta,
467 U.S. 479,485 (1984)).
233. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284,295 (1973)).
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assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and
innocence,"'
but restrictions may not be "arbitrary or
disproportionate" to legitimate government purposes 25' 'and
"may 'not
' 36
be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice. 2
Applying these rules to the direct connection doctrine, it could be
argued that a mechanical application that focuses on the degree of
connection between the third party and the crime, rather than on the
relevance of third party perpetrator evidence to the defendant's guilt,
is a mechanistic application of an arbitrary rule that unduly restricts
defendants from presenting exculpatory evidence. Since explicit
balancing under Rule 403 is an easily applied alternative that can
adequately accommodate the legitimate interests of the state while
not risking improper exclusion of defense evidence, the state's use of
the direct connection doctrine is unconstitutional.
Alternatively, the state could contend that the right to present a
defense is not triggered until a defendant has established that the
evidence sought to be admitted is "relevant and material to the
defense." 7 The direct connection doctrine is an appropriate means
of determining relevance and materiality, and therefore does not
contravene the Constitution. Moreover, where the Court has found
admission of defense evidence to be constitutionally required, the
evidence was "critical to [the] defense."" 8 Evidence that does not
pass the direct connection test arguably cannot be viewed as critical.
Because the Court has not clearly articulated how the various tests
are to be interpreted and the appropriate standard for balancing the
competing interests, 9 it is unclear how this issue would be resolved.
Even if a court would refuse to strike down the doctrine itself as
violative of the Constitution, however, given the fundamental nature
of the right that is implicated, its pivotal role in the adversary system
of criminal justice, and the potential impact of the direct connection
doctrine on that Constitutional right, it seems appropriate that courts
should at least use more care in assessing proffers of alternative
perpetrator evidence than is currently the case.
234. Rock, 483 U.S. at 55 n.11 (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302). "The accused

does not have an unfettered right to offer [evidence] that is incompetent, privileged,
or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence." Montana v. Egelhoff,
518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996) (plurality) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988)).
235. Rock, 483 U.S. at 56.
236. Id. at 55 (quoting Chambers,410 U.S. at 302).
237. Id. (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,23 (1967)).
238. Id. (quoting Chambers,410 U.S. at 302).
239. See Larsen, supra note 181, at 676; John Lausch, Note, Stephens v. Miller: The
Need to Shield Rape Victims, Defend Accused Offenders, and Define a Workable
ConstitutionalStandard, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 346, 368 (1995). For another analysis of
the constitutional issues relating to such evidence, see Donald A. Dripps, Relevant
But PrejudicialExculpatory Evidence: Rationality Versus Jury Trial and the Right to
Put On a Defense, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1389, 1402-07 (1996) [hereinafter Dripps,
Relevant but Prejudicial].
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Additionally, the direct connection doctrine unduly interferes with
a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Allowing trial
courts to exclude evidence that advances a defendant's theory of
defense because of a risk that juries may be confused or distracted is
"inconsistent with values embodied in the Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury."24°
In an insightful article addressing reliability-based exclusionary
rules, Professor Katherine Goldwasser recognized that such rules
impair a defendant's Sixth Amendment jury trial right.24 ' "The Sixth
Amendment guarantee of the right to trial by jury in criminal cases is
founded on the notion that juries are likely to be more protective of
an accused than are judges."242 As fact finders, juries are given the
responsibility "for assessing the credibility of witnesses and reliability
of physical evidence, determining the weight to be given each item of
evidence and inferences to be drawn from the evidence, and doing
whatever else they need to do in order to figure out, as best they can,
'what really happened."'243 This responsibility and authority belong to
the jury alone. It is simply not the role of the judge to find facts.2u
As noted by Professor Goldwasser, three essential considerations
support the jury's role as fact-finder: that jurors are, like the
defendant, ordinary people; that they reflect a group consensus rather
than act as an individual decision-maker; and that they bring a fresh
perspective to their decision-making.245 These considerations mean
that juries are likely to offer a variety of views, are more conducive to
deliberation, and are more likely to "be receptive to-or at least give
meaningful consideration to-the unusual, unexpected, or even
implausible stories criminal defendants sometimes bring to court."2
The "net effect" is that the factual issues are likely to
be resolved by a decisionmaker that is less likely than a judge to be
affected by pro-government bias, that is more likely than a judge to
a
bring to bear multiple perspectives, and that is less likely than
247
judge to truncate its attention to the accused's side of the case.
The direct connection doctrine, by setting an artificially high
threshold for admission and excluding jury consideration of any
evidence relating to an alleged alternative perpetrator when that
threshold cannot be met, categorically deprives a defendant of
240. Goldwasser, supra note 229, at 636.
241. See id. at 636-42.
242. Id at 636.
243. Id. at 636-37.
244. See id. at 637.
245. See id. at 637-38. But see Samuel R Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriagesof Justice
in CapitalCases, 61 Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1998, at 125, 145-46 (suggesting
that, because juries lack experience with the system, they may not provide significant
protection to innocent defendants) [hereinafter Gross, Miscarriagesof Justice].
246. Goldwasser, supra note 229, at 639.
247. Id.
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precisely what it is we purport to care about
in guaranteeing the right to trial by jury-namely, providing for the
kind of decisionmaker who is most likely to listen to, actually hear,
and be open to full and separate consideration of, each and every
item 24of
evidence an accused may offer in support of his or her
8
case.

Moreover, the direct connection doctrine shows a distrust for jurors
and their ability to adequately assess evidence. Courts are apparently

concerned that a jury will inappropriately rely on speculative evidence
and will be distracted from the real issue in the case.249 However,

"[p]robative evidence should not be excluded because of 'crabbed
notions of relevance or excessive mistrust of juries."' z0 Additionally,
as Professor Wigmore recognized, the risk is not nearly as significant
as these courts indicate, because "if the evidence is really of no
appreciable value no harm is done in admitting it."'" The only
"prejudice" to the government occurs if the jury finds the evidence
sufficient to create a reasonable doubt-but if it does, it is likely
precisely because the government has failed to carry its burden to
negate other theories of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
At its core, the direct connection doctrine appears to be based
largely on a fear of prejudice
to the government in the form of
"erroneous acquittals." 2 This concern was first identified in State v.
May,253 the first known case in which the doctrine appeared.,-" In
May, the court stated that such excluded evidence is "too uncertain,
and too easily fabricated falsely for the purpose of deceiving, to be
relied on or acted on in a Court." 5 More recently, a similar theme
248. Id. Professor Goldwasser reached this same conclusion with regard to
unreliability-based rules of exclusion. See id. at 645. Not all commentators agree that
the jury trial right is of such importance. Professor Dripps, in acknowledging the
conflict between exclusion of favorable defense evidence and reliability concerns,
suggests that this problem can be solved by giving the defendant the option of a bench
trial. See Dripps, Relevant but Prejudicial,supra note 239, at 1426.
249. See supra notes 212-22 and accompanying text.
250. Allen v. United States, 603 A.2d 1219, 1224 (D.C. 1992) (quoting Riordan v.
Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 698 (7th Cir. 1987)). The Allen Court included as
"probative evidence" those "arguments based on reasonable inferences from such
evidence." Allen, 603 A.2d at 1224 n.10. Such mistrust may be unwarranted. "The
strength of the jury is the difficulty to hoodwink twelve average Americans in rational
matters." William David Gross, The UnfortunateFaith:A Solution to the Unwarranted
Reliance Upon Eyewitness Testimony, 5 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 307, 325 (1999)
[hereinafter Gross, Unfortunate Faith].
251. 1A Wigmore, Evidence § 139, at 1724 (Tillers. Rev. 1983).
252. State v. Scheidell, 595 N.W.2d 661, 671 (Wis. 1999) ("An additional concern is
erroneous acquittals; a judge has no power 'to assure that an acquittal is based on the
proper legal standard: a reasonable doubt rather than a speculative one."' (quoting
McCord, supra note 2, at 976)).
253. 15 N.C. (1 Dev.) 268 (1833).
254. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
255. May, 15 N.C. at 272; see McCord, supra note 2, at 925 ("[T]he court's public
policy rationale for the rule, although tersely stated, is exactly the same one that has
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was repeated:
A defendant is not at liberty to present unsupported theories in the
guise of cross-examination and invite the jury to speculate as to
some cause other than one supported by the evidence. If it were
otherwise, defendants could always present some far-fetched theory
2%
on the hope that some juror might be taken in by it.
If speculative alternative perpetrator evidence is admitted, courts
believe juries will too easily acquit, and such acquittals wvill be
While this concern is not unfounded, it ignores the
unreviewable.
value our system places on avoiding conviction of the innocent. The
presumption of innocence and the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt are safeguards to ensure that the innocent are not
convicted.5" Our system reflects an explicit preference for allowing
some guilty people to go free in order to ensure that innocent
defendants are not wrongly convicted. 59
The direct connection doctrine creates an evidentiary hurdle,
disrupting the balance of the adversarial system. As noted, courts
employ the doctrine largely due to fear of erroneous acquittals. But
"to exclude defense evidence (and thereby increase the risk of an
erroneous conviction) solely out of concern about the risk of an
As Professor Wigmore
erroneous acquittal is flatly unacceptable."'
has recognized,
if the evidence is in truth calculated to cause the jury to doubt, the
court should not attempt to decide for the jury that this doubt is
purely speculative and fantastic but should afford the accused every
opportunity to create that doubt. A contrary rule is unfair to a
really innocent accused. 261
If the court admits alternative perpetrator evidence and the jury
improperly assesses it, at worst, there may be a wrongful acquittal.
But if otherwise appropriate evidence is excluded, the court creates an
animated [alternative perpetrator] doctrine for over a hundred and fifty years-such
evidence is 'too easily fabricated falsely for the purpose of deceiving."' (quoting May
v. State 15 N.C. (1 Dev.) at 333 (1833) (emphasis omitted))).
256. Commonwealth v. Maddox, 955 S.W.2d 718,721 (Ky. 1997).
257. McCord, supra note 2, at 977 ("[A]n acquittal-whether reasonable or not-is
unreviewable"). See generally Joshua Steinglass, The Justice Systemn in Jeopardy: The
Prohibitionon Government Appeals of Acquittals, 31 Ind. L Rev. 353, 353 (1998)
(noting that the "asymmetry in the right of appeal has produced a series of problems
inthe administration of the criminal law").
258. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1146.
259. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring) (-1 view
the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed
on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."); see also Mitchell, supra note 27, at
341 ("'Beyond a reasonable doubt' expresses the deep cultural value that 'it is better
to let ten guilty men go then convict one innocent man."').
260. Goldwasser, supra note 229, at 635-36.
261. Wigmore, supra note 251, § 139, at 1724.
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undue risk of wrongful conviction. Because our system has chosen to
prefer wrongful acquittals over wrongful convictions, 262 any doctrine
of exclusion should be based on other compelling justifications and
must be carefully crafted to do no more than necessary to meet those
justifications. The direct connection doctrine cannot meet this
exacting standard.2 63

Additionally, the direct connection doctrine improperly places a
burden on defendants 264 which they may be unable to meet, not
because the evidence does not exist, but because the system makes
this evidence difficult or impossible to obtain. Defendants often
operate with limited resources.265 When a defendant is represented by
the public defender, the attorney will often be confronted by limited
investigative resources and funds.2 6 This is also true when counsel is
appointed.267 Even where counsel is retained, the defendant may not
262. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
263. To the extent that the interest in orderly trials and avoidance of delay are
significant, they can be adequately accommodated by rules that have less of an impact
on a defendant's right to present a defense. Courts always have inherent authority to
control the introduction of evidence to avoid cumulative evidence or other delaying
tactics. See, e.g., Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1, 7 (D.C. 1996) (allowing broad
discretion to the trial court to exclude cumulative evidence). Trial judges can use
cautionary instructions to ensure that the jury stays focused on the appropriate use to
be made of evidence introduced to support the defendant's theory of defense. See
generally McCormick, supra note 214, § 59, at 98-99 (discussing judicial instructions
for limited admissibility). In light of these existing mechanisms to protect against
actual delay, confusion, and distraction, the direct connection doctrine is unnecessary.
Given its potential impact on a defendant's constitutional rights, it is also
inappropriate.
264. As one court stated:
[T]he defense has no responsibility to produce affirmative evidence of an
alternative perpetrator's guilt through independent forensic testing or any
other means.... Indeed, one court has cautioned that requiring alternativeperpetrator evidence to link clearly the third party to the crime may place
"too high a burden on a criminal defendant who is without the vast
investigatory resources of the State."
Smithart v. State, 988 P.2d 583, 590 (Alaska 1999) (quoting State v. Robinson, 628
A.2d 664, 667 (Me. 1993).
265. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Neither EqualNor Just: The Rationing and Denial
of Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 Ann. Surv.
Am. L. 783, 816-20 ("The most fundamental reason for the poor quality or absence of
legal services for the poor in the criminal justice system is the refusal of government
to allocate sufficient funds for indigent defense programs."); Douglas W. Vick,
Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death
Sentences, 43 Buff. L. Rev. 329, 381 (1995) (noting fee caps in some states for
appointed counsel in death penalty cases).
266. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player:
Alternating Visions of the Public Defender, 84 Geo. L.J. 2419,2442 (1996); Vick, supra
note 265, at 390.
267. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an
Ex Ante Parity Standard, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 242, 254-55, 295 (1997)
[hereinafter Dripps, Ineffective Assistance] (discussing how appointed counsel also
suffer from limited resources); Givelber, supra note 38, at 1376 (stating that defense
counsel must often depend on the goodwill of the state or judge to obtain resources).
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possess unlimited resources for investigation.' 6s Moreover, regardless
of whether lack of funds is a significant problem, the investigative
options available to the defense fall far short of those available to the
prosecution and police.2 69

Not only does the doctrine improperly shift a part of the
government's burden to the defendant, it increases the risk of
wrongful conviction of the innocent, both in individual cases and on a
systemic level. That innocent individuals are wrongfully convicted is
not open to serious debate 7 0 Numerous studies, done over the past
seventy years, reveal disturbing evidence that erroneous convictions
are more prevalent than once believed. 27 ' While reliable estimates are
difficult,272723 it is clear this is a larger problem than previously
thought.

"Many courts limit expenditures by requiring a preliminary showing of need...."
Vick, supra note 265, at 392. "Frequently, lawyers are denied the investigative ...
assistance essential to providing adequate representation. Here, again, the courts
have constructed yet another Catch-22 by requiring the lawyer to demonstrate an
extensive need for... investigative assistance, a showing that frequently cannot be
made without the very ... assistance that is sought." Bright, supra note 265, at 820. In
the context of alternative perpetrator evidence, this may require that, in order to
obtain investigative resources to establish the required direct connection, the attorney
will be required to present evidence of such connection. But without investigative
resources, finding such evidence may be difficult. This is particularly true with an
innocent defendant who, because of lack of knowledge about the offense, cannot help
counsel in developing the facts. See Dripps, Ineffective Assistance,supra,at 295.
268. See, eg., Edward C. Monahan & James J.Clark, Funds for Resources for
Indigent Defendants Represented By Retained Counsel, Champion, Dec. 1996, 16, 19
(discussing whether the state or the defendant should bear the burden of paying for
experts, investigators and other necessary resources).
269. See, e.g., Dripps, Relevant but Prejudicial,supra note 239, at 1411 (noting "the
inability of most defendants to bring to bear the investigative resources available to
the police"); Givelber, supra note 38, at 1360, 1374-79 ("The prosecution can both
compel and purchase testimony in ways that are simply unavailable to the defense.");
Luban, Criminal Defenders, supra note 27, at 1738 (providing examples of this law
enforcement advantage: prosecutors can obtain warrants to search defendants and
their premises, can plant informants in defendants' cells and can, by means of
immunity, compel co-defendants to testify).
270. Judge Learned Hand stated in 1923, "Our procedure has always been haunted
by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream." United States v.
Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). "In the past decade, this complacent view
has been shattered." Gross, Miscarriagesof Justice,supra note 245, at 125.
271. See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriagesof Justice in
Potentially CapitalCases, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 21, 56-64 (1987) (discussing causes of error
in the judicial process); C. Ronald Huff et. al, Convicted But Innocent 63-82 (1996);
National Institute of Justice, Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science: Case
Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial (1996)
[hereinafter Convicted by Juries]. The first systematic study was published in 1932.
See Edwin M. Borchard, Convicting the Innocent: Errors of Criminal Justice (Da
Capo Press 1790) (1932). For a brief description of the case studies dating back to the
1930s, see Givelber, supra note 38, at 1346-58. For a fairly complete catalogue of
studies since 1932, see Bedau & Radelet, supra, at 25 n.20.
272. See Givelber, supra note 38, at 1322-25; Gross, Miscarriagesof Justice, supra
note 245, at 127.
273. See Givelber, supra note 38, at 1318-20 (cataloguing scholarly and media
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Research on wrongful convictions demonstrates that there are
many reasons innocent people are convicted of crimes that they did
not commit. Among these reasons are eyewitness misidentification,
false confessions, erroneous witness testimony, confusing
circumstantial evidence, ineffective counsel, and police or
prosecutorial error.274 It should be kept in mind that, in every case in
which an innocent person is wrongfully convicted, an alternative
perpetrator who is the real criminal has not been apprehended. 75 In
every case of wrongful conviction, law enforcement was either
unwilling or unable to properly identify the true perpetrator. What is
not known is in how2 76 many of these cases better police investigation
would have done SO.
The direct connection doctrine serves as a disincentive for police to
adequately investigate alternatives other than the one they have
chosen. It is clear that police have a strong incentive to "clear"
cases,277 and this is particularly true with more serious, publicized
crimes. 27 Once such cases are cleared, however, police have little
incentive to investigate further, especially if that investigation may
weaken the case already built. 79 If police and prosecutors know that

defendants have limited resources to investigate other possibilities,
and that even if defendants obtain resources to do so, evidence that
they find will be unusable unless they can establish a direct connection
to the crime, police and prosecutors will have little incentive to
explore alternative theories once they have reached a preliminary
conclusion.' Since a defendant's ability to attack that conclusion is
sharply limited by the direct connection doctrine, the risk of
erroneous conviction increases.
While this would clearly support the conclusion that the doctrine
should not apply when there is a significant chance that a defendant is
discussions of innocent party convictions).
274. See Convicted by Juries, supra note 271, at 15-18; Bedau & Radelet, supra

note 271, at 56-64 (compiling data on reasons for innocent party convictions); Huff,

supra note 271, at 63-82; Gross, Miscarriagesof Justice, supra note 245, at 133-42.
275. See Givelber, supra note 38, at 1394; Gross, UnfortunateFaith, supra note 250,
at 326-27.
276. Last year, the United States Attorney General, "moved by the recent

examples of exoneration of innocent prisoners... announced plans for several

initiatives to prevent such injustices."
They include an effort to "train law
enforcement and prosecutors to affirmatively seek out exculpatory evidence even
though a suspect has been identified.... [T]he effort will detail how police and
prosecutors overlooked crucial evidence of innocence due to the 'blinders' effect of
seeing and seeking only evidence supportive of the initial determination of guilt."
NACDL News, Meeting With Attorney General Focuses on Innocence, 22
Champion, June 1998, at 8.
277. See Givelber, supra note 38, at 1361.
278. See Dripps, Miscarriages,supra note 38, at 639-40.
279. See Dripps, Ineffective Assistance, supra note 267, at 267; Dripps, Relevant but
Prejudicial,supra note 239, at 1416-17; Huff, supra note 271, at 64.
280. See Dripps, Relevant but Prejudicial,supra note 239, at 1416-17.
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innocent, even in cases where the evidence of the defendant's guilt is
strong and the alternative perpetrator evidence is relatively weak, the
doctrine is problematic. First, the fact that there is strong evidence
against a defendant is no guarantee of the defendant's guilt, as many
wrongful conviction cases demonstrate. "8- In each of these cases, the
evidence was strong enough for the jury to convict, yet later
examination revealed the defendant to be innocent. Thus, the mere
fact that the evidence appears strong is not determinative.
Moreover, there are significant systemic benefits to not applying the
doctrine, even in cases of relatively strong evidence of guilt and weak
Over time, if alternative
alternative perpetrator showings.
perpetrator evidence is admissible at trial, police may have an
Such an expanded
incentive to better investigate all alternatives.'
investigation may unearth evidence that clearly demonstrates that the
alleged alternative perpetrator is not guilty of the offense. This will
likely preclude the defendant from advancing the alternative
perpetrator theory and make conviction of a guilty defendant more
likely .m Alternatively, the police may find evidence during their
expanded investigation indicating that the alternative perpetrator,
rather than the defendant, is responsible for the crime. Charges can
then be dropped against the defendant and brought against the
alternative perpetrator. In such cases, the ultimate goal of the
adversarial system, convicting the guilty and avoiding conviction of
the innocent, will be served.'
281. See supra notes 271-74 and accompanying text. For further discussion of this
problem, see generally Yellin, supra note 43, at 19 (stressing the need for defense
attorneys to be zealous advocates to strengthen the justice system's aims to prevent
false convictions).
282. This point is recognized but rejected by Professor Simon in connection with a

more generalized discussion of responses to aggressive defense of guilty clients. He
states as follows:
First, we might ask why someone cynical about the dedication of public
officials would expect them to respond to acquittals due to aggressive
defense by raising their standards of practice. Might not they simply slack
off, rationalizing their failures on the excuse that the courts are not
cooperating?

Or perhaps they might increase their efforts along less

constructive lines than those contemplated by the argument, spending more
time on misleading and coercive tactics of their own.
Simon, supra note 30, at 1711-12; see also Deborah L. Rhode, An Adversarial
Exchange on Adversarial Ethics: Text, Subtext, and Contert, 41 J. Legal Educ. 29, 3233 (1991) (stating that without a zealous defense, prosecutors and police will become

complacent in investigating alternative suspects). I acknowledge, as suggested by
Professor Simon, the possibility that this may merely force investigative abuses
underground, but I do not believe the possibility of abuse should be determinative.
283. If the police respond as hoped, this will generally prevent damage to innocent
third parties because the alternative perpetrator evidence will never be presented.

While exclusion of such evidence absent a direct connection will accomplish the same
result, it does so at much greater risk to convicting the innocent.

284. "When a factually innocent person is convicted and punished, society gains
nothing to offset" the burden placed on the wrongfully convicted individual. Carl M.
Selinger, The Perry Mason Perspective and Others: A Critique of Reductionist
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CONCLUSION

Our adversary system of criminal justice requires the prosecution to
shoulder the burden of proving a defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Whether or not our system is the best available, it
reflects a balance of competing interests designed to prevent
government overreaching, preserve autonomy and dignity of
defendants, and convict the guilty while protecting innocent
individuals against false convictions. Attorneys operating within this
system must have broad leeway to challenge the government's case,
which includes both the ability to make technical arguments urging
reasonable doubt and the power to present evidence that creates a
foundation for the defendant's version of the case.
Ethical rules must and do allow attorneys to engage in conduct that
might otherwise be morally or ethically questionable in order to
implement this balance of competing interests.'
But in many
jurisdictions, this leeway is compromised by the direct connection
doctrine, an evidentiary rule of exclusion that keeps from the jury the
very evidence that is needed to advance these institutional and
individual goals. This rule should be changed. Jurisdictions should
abolish the direct connection doctrine, either as a matter of
constitutional interpretation or in the exercise of sound policy. In its
place courts should substitute a more appropriate analysis to
determine admissibility of alternative perpetrator evidence.
Initially, in determining the admissibility of such evidence, courts
should be clear that the focus is not on whether the evidence
establishes the guilt of the third party, but on what relevance the
evidence has to the guilt or innocence of the defendant on trial. That
determination should be made using traditional standards of
relevance. 286 Thus, if the evidence has any "rational tendency to
engender a reasonable doubt with respect to an essential feature of
the State's case,"' or "tends in any way, even indirectly, to establish a
reasonable doubt of [a] defendant's guilt,"' the evidence is relevant.

Thinking About the Ethics of Untruthful Practices By Lawyers for 'Innocent'
Defendants, 6 Hofstra L. Rev. 631, 643 (1978).
285. Although this analysis focuses on the ability of the attorney to offer the
evidence, the evidence is offered on behalf of the defendant. Thus, the defendant
must be involved in the decision whether to present it. Before offering such evidence,
the attorney should consult with the client and fully explore both the tactical risks and
potential effect on the third party involved. If, after consultation, the client chooses
to go forward with the blame-shifting evidence, the attorney should be required to do
so. This implements the defendant's personal right to present a defense.
286. See Fed. R. Evid. 401.
287. State v. Fulston, 738 A.2d 380, 384 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (quoting
State v. Sturdivant, 155 A.2d 771,778 (N.J. 1959)).
288. Washington v. State, 737 So. 2d 1208, 1222-23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(quoting Rivera v. State, 561 So. 2d 536, 539 (Fla. 1990)).
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If the evidence passes this test of relevance, the court should then
engage in a careful balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect.
In doing so, the court should "ask what rational inferences of
innocence the evidence supports, what risks of improper decision the
evidence poses, and whether any response short of exclusion could
secure the probative value of the evidence without its prejudicial
baggage. ' ' 290 After addressing these questions, the court should
exclude relevant exculpatory alternative perpetrator evidence only if
it can make a finding on the record "that the jury's consideration of
the proffered evidence would make an irrational acquittal
substantially more likely than a rational acquittal.' -91 By focusing on
the precise issues at stake and limiting the role of the judge in
resolving issues that appropriately belong to the jury, this revised
approach will allow criminal defense attorneys to serve as zealous
advocates for their clients and will help to insure that the important
interests of all participants in the adversary system of criminal justice
are properly accommodated.

289. In almost all cases, evidence of an alternative perpetrator will be relevant.
290. Dripps, Relevant but Prejudicial,supra note 239, at 1421.
291. Id at 1420. "[Aln on-the-record finding about prejudice would impress upon
trial judges the special sensitivity of excluding defense evidence in a criminal case. It
would also help to put some teeth into appellate review of decisions excluding
evidence." Id. at 1421.

Notes & Observations

